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Since the sovereignty handover and establishment of the Hong Kong 
SAR in 1997, Hong Kong has faced the dual challenges of 
balancing her need to facilitate a cross-border arbitration regime 
which is compatible with Mainland China under the principle of 
“one country, two systems”, and promoting herself as an 
international arbitration center. The two goals are at times 
incompatible, as accommodating the localized needs and standards 
of Mainland China often requires Hong Kong courts to be more 
“flexible” than established international arbitration standards 
would allow. This Article attempts to give a comprehensive analysis 
of the above problems. First, this Article surveys all the cases of the 
enforcement of Mainland China arbitration awards in Hong Kong 
courts since the handover to present the actual interpretation of the 
standard of cross-border arbitration in Hong Kong with Mainland 
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China. Second, from this comprehensive evaluation of the 
enforcement landscape, this Article makes a macro-proposition over 
the interaction between the Mainland China arbitral regime and the 
Hong Kong courts, with the judgments of the Hong Kong courts 
serving as a catalyst for improvements in the rules and practices of 
the Mainland China arbitral authorities. This Article gives credit to 
the proper type of interaction between the two sides, i.e. the positive 
interaction trend where Mainland China arbitral authorities 
reflecting on Hong Kong’s arbitral enforcement judgments, become 
persuaded and incentivized to change their rules to cohere with the 
high and internationally accepted arbitration standards that Hong 
Kong maintains. This Article argues that “positive interaction” is 
important to the cross-border arbitration development. Despite the 
recent halt, or even reversal, of the positive interaction trend in 
light of the Keeneye case, this Article argues that positive 
interaction should be and is likely to be resumed, as Hong Kong 
seeks to maintain its image as an international arbitration 
powerhouse and Mainland China continues to modernize and 
internationalize its arbitration system. In the long run, this 
improved cross-border arbitration consensus will bring about the 
healthy development of the legal cooperation between the two sides 
and act as an engine for economic growth in the Greater China 
region. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
Arbitration has been a popular means of dispute resolution for 
handling foreign business in both Hong Kong and Mainland China.2 
Hong Kong has been a member of the 1958 United Nations 
Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards (the “New York Convention”) since 1977, when, as the 
then-British colony, the United Kingdom extended its application to 
Hong Kong. In 1986, the People’s Republic of China acceded to the 
New York Convention.3 Cross-border arbitration between the two 
sides commenced in 1989 when the first award made by China 
                                                
2 According to the CIETAC, foreign related arbitration cases it accepted reached the record 
high in 2009 of 559. CIETAC Caseload Hits a Record High in 2009, CIETAC 
NEWSLETTER (Feb. 4, 2010), 
http://www.cietac.org/index/newsletter/47690b6b38216b7f001.cms. In 2010, the 209 
arbitration commissions in Mainland China accepted a total of 1219 foreign related 
arbitration cases. Foreign-related Arbitration Identified as Key Priority of Arbitration 
Service, CIETAC NEWSLETTER (Sept. 23 2011), 
http://www.cietac.org/index/newsletter/4772dbe48545837f001.cms.  
3 China has made two reservations when agreeing to the New York Convention. First, it 
only recognizes awards made by member states of the Convention; second, it only applies 
the Convention provisions to conflicts arising from legal relationships, whether contractual 
or not, that are considered commercial under PRC law.  
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International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (the 
“CIETAC”) in Beijing sought recognition and enforcement in Hong 
Kong, and this marked the beginning of the cross-border arbitration 
system in Hong Kong with Mainland China.4   
Since the sovereignty handover in 1997, as the New York 
Convention could no longer apply within one sovereign State, the 
cross-border arbitration scheme and mutual enforcement regime 
based on the Convention ceased to have effect between the two 
jurisdictions. To fill in the post-handover legal lacuna, the Supreme 
People’s Court of Mainland China and the Department of Justice of 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (the “SAR”) signed 
an Arrangement on Mutual Recognition and Enforcement of 
Arbitral Awards (the “Mutual Arrangement”) between Mainland 
China and Hong Kong under the “one country, two systems” 
principle.5 Under the Mutual Arrangement, Article 7 provides a 
number of grounds for refusal of enforcement of arbitral awards 
from the other side, which are similar to those listed in Article V of 
the New York Convention.6 A matter that has created much debate 
and speculation over the past fifteen years, however, concerns the 
different understanding of the “public policy” ground at both sides 
and in association, the level of standard of review of the Mainland 
China arbitral awards in Hong Kong.7 Claims on this ground are 
particularly easy to make and, as Hong Kong and Mainland China 
obviously hold on to different legal systems and ideologies, an 
arbitration which has been conducted according to Mainland China 
standards may easily be impeached under public policy grounds by 
applying a more stringent common law standard in Hong Kong.  
After the establishment of the Hong Kong SAR in 1997, 
particularly after the promulgation of the Mutual Arrangement in 
                                                
4 Xian Chu Zhang, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards between Mainland China and Hong 
Kong: Before and After Reunification, in THE NEW LEGAL ORDER IN HONG KONG 192, 192 
(Raymond Wacks ed., 1999). 
5 Arrangement Concerning Mutual Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards 
between Mainland China and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, June 21, 
1999, available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.hk/intracountry/eng/pdf/mainlandmutual2e.pdf [hereinafter 
Mutual Arrangement]. 
6 Id. art. 7; see United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards art. V, June 10, 1958, 303 U.N.T.S. 4739 [hereinafter New York 
Convention]. 
7 See generally Gu Weixia, Recourse against Arbitral Awards: How Far Can a Court Go? 
Supportive and Supervisory Role of Hong Kong Courts as Lessons to Mainland China 
Arbitration, 4 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 481, 481-500 (2005). 
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1999, Hong Kong has had to face the dual challenges of finding her 
place in the new cross-border arbitration order and leading the new-
born SAR forward in becoming a regional and international 
arbitration center. For reasons of comity between the two 
jurisdictions and the unreasonableness of requiring Mainland China 
arbitrations to adhere to the strict standards of Hong Kong law and 
practice, Hong Kong courts have long since closely scrutinized all 
public policy claims challenging Mainland China awards seeking 
enforcement in Hong Kong, and have placed a high threshold of 
requiring the alleged infringement to be fundamental to Hong 
Kong’s sense of justice and morality.8 Delicate issues of Hong 
Kong’s cross-border arbitration relationship with Mainland China 
have arisen, which often underscore the legal conflicts between the 
two sides.9 On one hand, there is a need to foster the modernization 
of Mainland China towards the higher international standards of 
arbitration which Hong Kong seeks to maintain, whilst on the other 
hand, in association with the sovereignty change, there is the 
practical need to facilitate a cross-border arbitration regime which is 
compatible with Mainland China under the principles of “one 
country, two systems” and closer economic cooperation. Therefore, 
a more flexible approach in reviewing Mainland China’s arbitral 
awards is needed in order to maintain the viability of cross-border 
transactions. Caught in this quagmire, it is challenging for Hong 
Kong courts to decide what standards they should require of 
Mainland China arbitration.  
This Article attempts to give a comprehensive analysis of the 
above problems and make two contributions. First, this Article 
surveys all the cases of the enforcement of Mainland China 
arbitration awards by the Hong Kong SAR courts since the 1997 
handover to present the actual interpretation of the standard of 
cross-border arbitration in Hong Kong with Mainland China. In 
association with the case review, this Article compiles a series of 
tables on basis of the data collected at the Hong Kong International 
Arbitration Center, which consolidates the numbers of cases 
received by the Hong Kong courts where enforcement of the 
Mainland China awards are sought in Hong Kong, the rate of 
                                                
8 See Hebei Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. Polytek Eng’g Co., [1999] 2 H.K.C.F.A.R. 111, 117-18 
(C.F.A.) (discussing public policy considerations). 
9 For an introduction of the arbitration system in Mainland China, see GU WEIXIA, 
ARBITRATION IN CHINA: REGULATION OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND PRACTICAL 
ISSUES (Sweet & Maxwell eds., 2012). 
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challenges to enforcement, and the rate of such challenges being 
successful. The cases are collected from the 1997 handover (July 
1st) till the end of 2012, covering a period of approximately fifteen 
years. 
Second, from this comprehensive evaluation of the enforcement 
landscape, this Article makes a macro-proposition and identifies a 
healthy and welcome interaction trend between the Mainland China 
arbitration regime and the Hong Kong courts where the judgments 
of the Hong Kong courts serve as a catalyst for improvements in the 
rules and practices of the Mainland China arbitral authorities. This 
Article gives credit to such proper type of interaction, i.e. the 
positive interaction, which this Article defines as the phenomenon 
or trend where Mainland China arbitral authorities, reflecting on 
Hong Kong arbitral enforcement judgments, become persuaded and 
incentivized to change their rules and practices to cohere with the 
high and internationally accepted arbitration standards that Hong 
Kong maintains. This Article argues that “positive interaction” is 
important to the cross-border arbitration and judicial assistance 
development. Despite the recent halt, or even reversal, of the 
positive interaction trend in light of the Keeneye case,10 this Article 
argues that positive interaction should be and is likely to be resumed, 
as Hong Kong seeks to maintain its image as an international 
arbitration powerhouse and Mainland China continues to modernize 
and internationalize its arbitration system. In the long run, this 
improved cross-border arbitration consensus will bring about the 
healthy development of the legal cooperation between the two sides 
and act as an engine for economic growth in the Greater China 
region.  
Structurally, this Article is divided into five parts. Following 
this Introduction, Part II gives a detailed historical account of the 
current cross-border arbitration system between Hong Kong and 
Mainland China. The historical review is intended to compare the 
pre-handover cross-border arbitral relation between Hong Kong and 
Mainland China with that of the post-handover, and to give a 
historical background of the dual challenges that Hong Kong faces 
in balancing a cross-border arbitration regime with Mainland China 
today. In Part III, the Article examines all of the Mainland China 
arbitration awards seeking enforcement in Hong Kong since the 
1997 sovereignty handover, in order to give a consolidated view of 
                                                
10 Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd. (Keeneye II), [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 627 (C.A.). 
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the development of cross-border arbitration jurisprudence. Doctrinal 
research and law and development studies are mainly adopted in 
Part III for going over the cases and associated literatures 
commenting on the cases. This Part tracks down the jurisprudence, 
discourse, and development of cross-border arbitration in Hong 
Kong with Mainland China both before and after the handover. By 
comparing post-handover arbitral enforcement cases in Hong Kong 
with respect to Mainland China to those preceding the handover, 
Part III also provides a consolidated view of the law and 
development in the field. Part IV analyzes the trend on cross-border 
arbitration between the two jurisdictions over one and a half 
decades. It argues how the Hong Kong jurisprudence has helped 
shape the cross-border arbitration regime over the years by 
encouraging “positive interaction” at the Mainland China side. It 
then explains that the recent case of Keeneye may have caused a halt 
in such positive interaction. Moreover, Part IV gives credit to 
positive interaction as the prospective law and policy direction for 
judicial assistance development between the two sides. Part V wraps 
up the Article with conclusions. The author opines that the Keeneye 
case could be an unfortunate development and offers reflections of 
why positive interaction should be resumed and continued. Part V 
also discusses some other contributions this Article might bring to 
the literature. 
 
 THE LEGAL PARADIGM OF CROSS-BORDER 
ARBITRATION BETWEEN HONG KONG AND MAINLAND CHINA 
 The Pre-Handover New York Convention System 
Before the reunification, arbitral awards were recognized and 
enforced across the border on the basis of the accession of both 
China and the United Kingdom to the New York Convention. This 
pre-handover cross-border arbitration system, as enforced by the 
Convention, was fairly well implemented. From its inception in 
1989 till its end in June 1997, approximately 150 Mainland China 
awards were enforced by the High Court in Hong Kong.11 In 
accordance with the Convention, courts in Hong Kong limited their 
                                                
11 Zhang, supra note 3, at 192. 
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review to procedural matters.12 In particular, during that period, 
public policy challenges, known to be the most controversial but 
popular ground to challenge a Convention award, were never 
successful in enforcement proceedings involving Mainland China 
awards.13 Before the change of sovereignty, only two applications to 
enforce the CIETAC award were denied by Hong Kong courts 
under public policy ground. The two successful challenges were in 
Paklito Investment Ltd. v. Klockner East Asia Ltd.14 and Apex Tech 
Investment Ltd. v. Chuang’s Development (China) Ltd.15 
In Paklito, there was an argument between the parties of 
whether steel provided by the respondent seller was defective.16 The 
case was administered by CIETAC, where the tribunal notified the 
parties that it would employ its own experts to inspect the steel.17 
After investigation, the experts in their report found in favor of the 
claimant. 18  The respondent then informed the tribunal of its 
intention to comment against the report and to introduce new 
evidence to rebut its conclusion.19 However, the tribunal proceeded 
to render an award against the respondent without allowing it the 
opportunity to provide its case on the expert report. 20  In the 
enforcement proceedings, in February 1992, Master Cannon refused 
to enforce the award by reason that the respondent had been 
prevented from presenting its case and been denied a fair and equal 
opportunity of being heard.21  
The case was appealed to and heard by Judge Kaplan at the 
High Court in January 1993, in which he came to the same 
                                                
12 Article V(1) of the New York Convention lists a few grounds for refusal for enforcement 
to be proven by the Respondent, such as (a) lack of a valid arbitration agreement; (b) 
violation of due process; (c) excess of arbitral tribunal’s authority; (d) irregularity in the 
composition of arbitral tribunal or arbitral procedure; and (e) the award has not yet been 
binding, been set aside, or suspended. New York Convention art. V. The full text of the 
New York Convention is available at the UNCITRAL website, 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/XXII_1_e.pdf (last visited 
Dec. 5, 2013).  
13 Article V(2) of the New York Convention mandates that recognition and enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards may also be refused if the enforcement authority finds the 
enforcement will be against its public policy, or the dispute not arbitrable according to the 
law of the place of enforcement. New York Convention art. V. 
14 Paklito Inv. Ltd v. Klockner E. Asia Ltd., [1993] 2 H.K.L.R. 39, 50 (H.C.). 
15 Apex Tech Inv. Ltd v. Chuang’s Dev. (China) Ltd., [1996] 2 H.K.L.R. 155, 159 (C.A.).  
16 Paklito, [1993] at 2 H.K.L.R. 41. 
17 Id. at 42. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 40-41. 
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conclusion as Master Cannon, and dismissed the appeal.22 Moreover, 
Judge Kaplan made the following commentary on the cross-border 
arbitration as of that time:  
In the three years from 1990 to 1992, this court has 
enforced approximately 40 CIETAC awards. Some of 
these applications were opposed but this is the first 
time that enforcement has been refused. This is a 
creditable record and I would not like it thought that 
problems such as occurred in this case are 
commonplace in CIETAC arbitrations. Judges and 
arbitrators in all jurisdictions occasionally and 
unwittingly fall into error and it is in serious cases 
involving arbitral awards that the enforcing court 
refuses enforcement to prevent injustice. It has been 
my experience that in all other cases that I have 
considered from CIETAC the due process 
requirements have been fairly met.23 
 
A less noticed but important aspect of the Paklito case is its 
significance to the cross-border arbitration regime. First, it is the 
first case where a Mainland China arbitral award was refused 
enforcement in Hong Kong. Second, it is the first time a Mainland 
China arbitration authority has changed its arbitral rules in response 
to a Hong Kong court review.24 
One year after the judgment of Paklito, in March 1994, CIETAC 
revised its arbitration rules which had been in place since 1988. 
Article 40 of the 1994 CIETAC Rules, in amending Articles 26 to 
28 of the 1988 Rules, provided that “a copy of the expert report 
conducted by the tribunal be sent to the parties concerned who 
should also be offered an opportunity to express their opinions; in 
addition, the parties may require the experts to appear in the hearing 
to explain their report and conclusions.”25 This timely amendment 
showed that the Mainland China side was paying attention to the 
Hong Kong standard of conducting arbitrations. 
Apex Tech was the second case in which a Mainland China 
arbitral award was refused enforcement. It was again a CIETAC 
                                                
22 Id. at 40. 
23 Id. at 50. 
24 As will be further elaborated later in this article, such arbitral rule revisions constitute 
the main form of convergence of the two systems of arbitration across the border. 
25 Zhang, supra note 3, at 193 n.63. 
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award. The case concerned whether a certificate issued by the 
Guangdong land authority enabled the Mainland Chinese seller to 
transfer his right to use the land to a Hong Kong homebuyer.26 In 
the CIETAC arbitration, the tribunal conducted its own enquiries 
and consulted the Guangdong Province State-owned Land Bureau 
about the ambit of the certificate.27 Relying on the opinion by the 
Land Bureau that the certificate had been issued for foreign 
investment rather than commodity real property to be sold abroad, 
and without notifying the parties of the results of its enquiries, the 
tribunal made an award against the Hong Kong party.28  
In the enforcement proceedings of the first instance, Judge 
Leonard found that there had been a procedural irregularity, and that 
the Hong Kong party was deprived of an opportunity to be heard on 
the results of the tribunal’s enquiries.29 However, Judge Leonard 
held that the procedural irregularity was not prejudicial as the result 
could not have been different even if the opportunity to be heard 
had been granted, and therefore enforced the award.30 The Hong 
Kong buyer’s appeal was, however, allowed by the Court of Appeal 
(the “CA”). The bench unanimously found that the name of the 
certificate under the dispute was not conclusive and the Hong Kong 
party had not been given an opportunity to respond to the opinion of 
the Land Bureau in Guangdong.31 Although the CA did not disagree 
with the finding by Judge Leonard that there had been a procedural 
irregularity, the CA disagreed that had the respondent been given 
due opportunity to be heard, it could not have affected the outcome 
of the award and therefore allowed the appeal and refused to 
enforce the award.32 
Apart from illustrating its standard of review to be confined to 
due process checks of arbitral award, throughout the pre-handover 
years, the prevalent judicial attitude towards arbitration, particularly 
cross-border arbitration with Mainland China, seemed to have been 
rather pro-enforcement. In January 1993, while the cross-border 
arbitration system based on the New York Convention was still in 
its infant stage, Judge Kaplan, in Qinhuangdao Tongda Enterprise 
                                                
26 Apex Tech, [1996] at 2 H.K.L.R. 156. 
27 Id. at 157. 
28 Id. The arbitration award in question was also made under the 1988 CIETAC Arbitration 
Rules. 
29 Id. at 156, 159. 
30 Id. at 156. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 158-59. 
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Development Co. and Another v. Million Basic Co. Ltd., took the 
opportunity to lay out the judiciary’s pro-enforcement attitude 
towards cross-border awards from Mainland China, and its disdain 
towards enforcement challenges framed in terms of public policy. 33 
Qinhuangdao concerned a CIETAC award in which the tribunal 
held that the respondent had breached its contract. In the 
enforcement proceedings at the Hong Kong Court of First Instance 
(the “CFI”), the respondent argued that the contract was a forgery 
and that it would be against Hong Kong’s public policy to enforce 
an award based on a forged contract.34  
Judge Kaplan rejected the forgery argument on the facts, but 
commented in obiter that the New York Convention does not allow 
parties to an international arbitration to request from the Hong Kong 
courts a re-hearing on the merits of the case.35 The public policy 
ground for refusal must not be seen as a catch-all provision to be 
used wherever convenient. It is limited in scope and is to be 
sparingly applied. Moreover, public policy requires proceedings, 
both in the courts and in arbitral tribunals, to have a finite end. Once 
a tribunal has set a date for the end of the proceedings, it cannot be 
right that any party can go to the tribunal with new evidence and 
demand that it have an opportunity to be re-heard. Judge Kaplan 
referenced with approval Parsons & Whittemore v. RAKTA,36 in 
which the U.S. Circuit Judge Joseph Smith famously declared, “the 
Convention’s public policy defense should be construed narrowly. 
Enforcement of foreign arbitral awards may be denied on this basis 
only where enforcement would violate the forum state’s most basic 
notions of morality and justice.”37   
The narrow construction and application of the public policy 
ground has been upheld in virtually all New York Convention 
member states, and has ever since formed part of the basis of Hong 
Kong’s pro-enforcement policy in receiving foreign arbitral awards, 
in particular, awards received from Mainland China. The prudent 
judicial attitude under the Convention system discouraged 
challenges which sought to rely on the technical differences in 
                                                
33 Qinhuangdao Tongdao Tongda Enter. Dev. Co. & Another v. Million Basic Co. Ltd., 
[1993] 1 HKLR 173, 177 (H.C.). 
34 Id. at 176. 
35 Id. at 177. 
36 Id. at 178 (noting Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale de 
L’Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974)). 
37 Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale De L’Industrie Du Papier 
(RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974).  
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procedural standards across the border. Unfortunately, upon the 
handover, the Convention was rendered void as between Hong 
Kong and Mainland China, as the two jurisdictions were within one 
sovereign State, the People’s Republic of China. The situation was 
only remedied two years later by the Mutual Arrangement scheme 
in 1999. 
 
 The Mutual Arbitration Arrangement between Hong Kong 
and Mainland China 
Pursuant to the Basic Law, the mini-constitution in Hong Kong 
defining Hong Kong’s overall legal relationship with the Central 
Government in Beijing,38 laws previously in force in Hong Kong 
were to be maintained, except those which contravened the Basic 
Law, or specifically amended by the legislature.39 Laws which 
governed arbitration in Hong Kong, such as the Arbitration 
Ordinance (Cap.341) and the common law on arbitration, were all 
retained post-handover. As the retention of the arbitration laws was 
without amendment by the legislature or the Basic Law, in theory it 
would have provided a smooth transition for both domestic and 
international arbitrations in Hong Kong post-handover. On the other 
hand, although cross-border legal relations between Hong Kong and 
Mainland China had been considered by the Sino-British Joint 
Liaison Group, the possible issues with cross-border enforcement of 
arbitral awards after a sovereign change seemed to have been 
overlooked, as the Central Government in Beijing considered the 
matter to be one of “internal politics.”40  
The overlooked problem is as follows. After the handover, as 
the United Kingdom was no longer the sovereign of Hong Kong, its 
signature to the New York Convention could no longer cover the 
newly born Hong Kong SAR. Instead, upon the handover, the 
Chinese government extended her signature to the Convention 
                                                
38 For a general introduction to the Basic Law and the constitutional relationship between 
Hong Kong and the Central Government in mainland China, see Albert H. Y. Chen, 
Constitutional Adjudication in Post-1997 Hong Kong, 15 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 627, 627-
82 (2006) (discussing the difficulty for the judiciary in administration of “one country, two 
systems”).  
39 XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 8 (H.K.).  
40 Robert J. M. Morgan, The Transition of Sovereignty to the People’s Republic of China 
and the Arbitration Regime in Hong Kong: The Issues and Their Management, MEALEY’S 
INT’L ARB. REP., May 1997, at 18.  
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towards Hong Kong. However, as the New York Convention only 
deals with enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and Mainland 
China is no longer a country foreign to Hong Kong, the Hong Kong 
courts could no longer rely on the Convention to enforce Mainland 
China awards, and, likewise, Mainland China courts could no longer 
rely on the Convention to enforce Hong Kong awards.41 
This problem was fully portrayed in Ng Fung Hong Ltd. v. 
ABC.42 In that case, a CIETAC award was sought to be enforced at 
the CFI in Hong Kong, pursuant to section 2GG of what was then 
the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance (Cap. 341).43 Judge Findlay 
held that section 2GG only dealt with domestic arbitration.44 Since a 
Mainland China arbitration award was no longer international after 
the handover, it could not be a Convention award either. Section 
2GG could only apply to arbitration awards where the place of 
arbitration is within Hong Kong, in which case the Mainland China 
awards could not fall squarely into either.45 Hence, the applicant 
could only enforce the award by a separate action using the award 
as evidence of an unpaid debt.46 In coming to the conclusion, Judge 
Findlay rendered his decision with great reluctance: 
I must say that I reach this conclusion with some 
regret. The procedure for the enforcement of awards 
between Hong Kong and the rest of China was 
convenient and worked well. . . . [I]t is a pity that 
such an award cannot be enforced directly. What is 
equally important is that there may be difficulties in 
seeking to enforce a Hong Kong award in Mainland 
China. There seems to be no obvious reason why 
there should not be a simple mechanism put in place 
for the mutual enforcement of arbitral awards 
between Mainland China and Hong Kong, and I 
hope we will see such a system before too long.47 
 
                                                
41 LEGAL DEPARTMENT, HONG KONG, REPORT OF THE WORKING PARTY ON LEGAL AND 
PROCEDURAL ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN HONG KONG AND CHINA IN CIVIL AND 
COMMERCIAL MATTERS (Oct. 13, 1992)  (on file with author). 
42 Ng Fung Hong Ltd. v. ABC, [1998] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 155 (C.F.I). 
43 Id. at 156. 
44 Id. at 156-57. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 156. 
47 Id. at 157. 
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Soon after, in Hebei Import-Export Corp. v. Polytek 
Engineering Co. Ltd. (No 2), 48 the CA, in obiter, clarified the 
unfortunate situation that after the handover, awards made in 
Mainland China can neither be treated as New York Convention 
awards nor domestic awards. This, it was held, is because a 
purposive meaning has to be given to the words “domestic” in the 
sentence of Article I(1) of the Convention,49 especially in light of 
the principle of “one country, two systems.”50  
On the Mainland China side, people’s courts were indeed 
adopting the same position towards cross-border enforcement of 
arbitral awards rendered in Hong Kong. In July 1998, the Taiyuan 
Intermediate People’s Court in Shanxi Province indefinitely 
suspended enforcement of a Hong Kong award, due to lack of a 
clear legal basis.51 In about one year’s time, people’s courts in 
Beijing, Anhui, Shandong and Guangdong Provinces all followed 
suit in more than ten proceedings to refuse enforcement of Hong 
Kong awards in the Mainland.52 
The loss of the cross-border arbitration scheme with the 
Mainland side negatively impacted the arbitration business in Hong 
Kong, which had not only been an important legal service industry 
in Hong Kong but also a supporting industry to Hong Kong’s 
financial and trade services.53 Likewise, the legal lacuna seriously 
harmed the cross-border economic exchanges between the two sides. 
The then-Chief Justice of the Hong Kong SAR pointed out that it 
                                                
48 Hebei Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. Polytek Eng’g Co. (No 2), [1998] 1 HKC 192 (C.A.). 
49 Article I(1) of the New York Convention provides as follows: “This Convention shall 
apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of the 
State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are 
sought, and arising out of differences between persons, whether physical or legal. It shall 
also apply to arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their 
recognition and enforcement are sought.” New York Convention art. I.  
50 Hebei, [1998] at 1 H.K.C. 196-97. 
51 See Robert Morgan, Mutual Enforcement of Arbitral Awards between Hong Kong and 
the People’s Republic of China—One Country. Still No System, MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP., 
Feb. 1999, at 41 n.38.  
52 Interview with Mr. Shen Deyong, Vice President of the Supreme People’s Court in 
China, Wen Wei Bao, June 22, 1999, p A3. 
53 Xian Chu Zhang, The Agreement between Mainland China and the Hong Kong SAR on 
Mutual Enforcement of Arbitral Awards: Problems and Prospects, 29 HONG KONG L.J. 463, 
465 n.19 (1999) (citing Lok Kin Wah, Alienating Itself from the International Legal 
Framework; How Can Hong Kong Be a Financial Centre? XIANGGANG JINJI RIBAO (HONG 
KONG ECONOMIC TIMES), Aug. 12, 1998 at A22; and Wang Shengchang, The Mutual 
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in Hong Kong SAR and the Mainland China: A Deadlock 
Must Be Broken as Soon as Possible, a paper presented at the International Dispute 
Resolution Conference, Hong Kong, November 1998). 
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was important for the health of business and arbitration in both 
Hong Kong and the rest of China that there should be an efficient 
regime of mutual enforcement of arbitration awards. 54  It is 
noteworthy that although Article 95 of the Basic Law explicitly 
provides that the SAR may maintain judicial relations with the 
judicial organs of other parts of Mainland China, and the two sides 
may render assistance to each other,55 the lack of implementation 
details took both sides two years to work out the Mutual 
Arrangement as the new legal basis to replace the old landscape set 
up by the New York Convention. It had been reported that the slow 
progress in working out the cross-border arbitration scheme was 
costing millions of dollars in business in Hong Kong as people were 
forced to arbitrate in Singapore in order to get their arbitral awards 
enforced in China.56  
Against this backdrop, the conclusion of the Mutual 
Arrangement on June 21, 1999 deserves applause. It brought the 
long-awaited relief for many award holders and had a significant 
impact on the future of cross-border arbitration. The Mutual 
Arrangement declared that “the courts of the Hong Kong SAR agree 
to enforce the awards made pursuant to the Arbitration Law of the 
People’s Republic of China by the arbitration authorities in 
Mainland China . . . and the people’s courts of Mainland China 
agree to enforce the awards made in the Hong Kong SAR pursuant 
to the Arbitration Ordinance of the Hong Kong SAR.”57 
For eligibility requirements, the Mutual Arrangement mandates 
that where a party fails to comply with an arbitral award, whether 
made in Mainland China or in the Hong Kong SAR, the other party 
may apply to the relevant court in the place where the party against 
whom the application is filed is domiciled, or where the property to 
be enforced against is situated.58 The relevant court in Hong Kong 
would be the High Court, and in Mainland China the Intermediate 
People’s Court.59 For parties facing the enforcement, Article 7 of 
the Mutual Arrangement provides all the types of challenges 
                                                
54 Zhang, supra note 52, at 466 (referring to the Keynote address made by Andrew Li, the 
then-Chief Justice of the Court of Final Appeal of Hong Kong, at the International 
Commercial Arbitration: Asian Update Conference, Hong Kong, Nov. 13, 1997).  
55 XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 95 (H.K.). 
56 Zhang, supra note 52, at 465-66 (citing Karen Cooper & Jane Moir, Millions ‘Lost’ as 
Settlements Go to Singapore, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 30, 1998, at 3).  
57 Mutual Arrangement, para. 1. 
58 Mutual Arrangement, art. 1. 
59 Mutual Arrangement, art. 2. 
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available to them, as if they were parties to an application to enforce 
a New York Convention award. This is because Article V of the 
New York Convention is incorporated almost verbatim into Article 
7 of the Mutual Arrangement. There is one amendment, though, on 
public policy, as under the 7th paragraph of Article 7: 
The enforcement of the award may be refused if the 
court of Mainland China holds that the enforcement 
of the arbitral award in the Mainland would be 
contrary to the public interest of Mainland China, or 
if the court of Hong Kong SAR decides that the 
enforcement of the arbitral award in Hong Kong 
would be contrary to the public policy of the Hong 
Kong SAR.60 
 
In the New York Convention, the nature of the public policy ground 
is to allow enforcing courts to turn down the award if the 
enforcement of that award would be contrary to the public policy of 
that particular jurisdiction.61 As regards enforcement of cross-border 
arbitral awards, although it is evident that the different wording 
employed by Hong Kong and Mainland China constitute a ground 
of refusal of a different scope, it was unclear, at the time of the 
promulgation of this Mutual Arrangement, how exactly the two 
grounds differ.  
One may only guess that the concept of public interest is 
employed for Mainland China instead of public policy because a 
broader non-Convention meaning can be applied at opportune times, 
so as to accommodate Mainland China’s political or economic 
interests.62 In openly-publicized commentary on social and public 
interest in Mainland China, the concept includes not only expressed 
Chinese State commitments and social morality (which is in line 
with international practice), but also unexpressed State interests and 
localized short-term policies (which has no basis in international 
                                                
60 Mutual Arrangement, art. 7 (emphasis added). 
61  New York Convention, art. V.2(b). 
62 For example, in Revpower Ltd. v. Shanghai Far-East Aero-Technology Imp. & Exp. 
Corp., enforcement was denied on the basis of the social public interest being against the 
local economic interests. Revpower Ltd. v. Shanghai Far-East Aero-Technology Imp. & 
Exp. Corp. (Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, July 13, 1993), 
available at http://arb.rucil.com.cn/enarticle/default.asp?id=198 (last visited Dec. 5, 2013). 
See also Fredrick Brown & Catherine A. Rogers, The Role of Arbitration in Resolving 
Transnational Disputes: A Survey of Trends in the People’s Republic of China, 15 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 331, 341-42 (1997) (referring to the Revpower case). 
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practice), 63  and “has been characterized as not only a legal 
institution but also a political means to implement the [Chinese] 
domestic policy.”64 In contrast, under the public policy doctrine in 
Hong Kong, the Hong Kong courts have given public policy in the 
Mutual Arrangement the same meaning as applied in the New York 
Convention. In line with the international practice, the standard 
application of the public policy defense in Hong Kong has been that 
it should be construed narrowly and exercised with great caution. 
Awards may only be denied where enforcement would violate the 
forum’s public policy, i.e. Hong Kong’s most fundamental notion of 
morality and justice.65 
Despite these ongoing concerns, with the Mutual Arrangement 
in place, the problem faced in the Ng Fung Hong case was finally 
resolved, and the post-handover legal abyss in cross-border award 
enforcement was finally filled. The problem was also resolved 
retrospectively, as Article 10 of the Mutual Arrangement provided 
that Mainland China awards which had been refused enforcement 
during the period between July, 1 1997 and adoption of the 
Arrangement (February 1, 2000), were allowed to make fresh 
applications for enforcement.66 Hence, the Mutual Arrangement 
created a new cross-border arbitration scheme to replace the old 
New York Convention system, which was later codified into the 
Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance.67 The most recent amendment to 
the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance, taking effect in June 2011, 
also confirmed the contents of this cross-border arbitration 
Arrangement.68 
 
                                                
63 Zhang, supra note 52, at 476-77. 
64 Id. 
65 See Paklito, [1993] at 2 H.K.L.R. 50 (citing Parsons & Whittemore, at 508 F.2d 974); 
see also Hebei, [1998] at 1 H.K.C. 193-194 (citing Parsons & Whittemore at 508 F.2d 
974). 
66 Mutual Arrangement, art. X. 
67  The Arrangement is incorporated into the Hong Kong Arbitration (Amendment) 
Ordinance 2000 (Ordinance No.2 of 2000) and codified as Hong Kong Arbitration 
Ordinance, (2000) Cap. 341, pt. IIIA. 
68 Enforcement of Mainland Awards, H.K., Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance, (2011) Cap. 
609, pt. 10. div. 3, available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.hk/blis_pdf.nsf/6799165D2FEE3FA94825755E0033E532/C05
151C760F783AD482577D900541075?OpenDocument&bt=0 (last visited Dec. 5 2013). 
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 DEVELOPMENT OF CROSS-BORDER ARBITRATION IN HONG 
KONG SINCE HANDOVER: REVIEW OF MAINLAND CHINA 
ARBITRATION AWARDS BY HONG KONG COURTS 
This Part consolidates all of the cases of the enforcement of 
Mainland China arbitration awards by Hong Kong courts since the 
handover, in an attempt to present the jurisprudence of cross-border 
arbitration in Hong Kong with Mainland China and the actual 
interpretation of its standard of cross-border arbitration review. It 
analyzes how the courts of Hong Kong have received the new cross-
border arbitration framework on the basis of the Mutual 
Arrangement, how they have integrated the New York Convention 
jurisprudence to the new system, and how they have shifted their 
judicial attitudes towards the enforcement of Mainland China 
arbitral awards over the years. It examines cross-border 
enforcement of the Mainland China arbitral awards by the Hong 
Kong courts from the 1997 handover till the end of 2012, covering a 
period of approximately fifteen years. 
The analysis focuses on enforcement issues, which remains the 
area of greatest conflict and controversy within cross-border 
arbitration relations, especially with the arrival of cases such as 
Keeneye in 2011,69 where the two different systems and ideologies 
of law and arbitration across the border fight for dominance. Before 
the analysis, quantitative studies are given, to provide an overview 
of the change of caseload regarding challenges to the enforcement 
of Mainland China arbitration awards in Hong Kong in the past 
fifteen years, underling the “one country, two systems” innovation 
and Hong Kong’s change of judicial assistance attitude towards 
Mainland China. After the statistical evaluation of the enforcement 
landscape, this Part then moves to case jurisprudence analyses and 
qualitative examination of the role-play interaction between 
Mainland China arbitral regime and the Hong Kong courts, with the 
judgments of the Hong Kong courts identified to serve as a catalyst 
for improvements in the rules and practices of the Mainland China 
arbitral authorities. Part III is also intended to pave the way for the 
arguments on “positive interaction” in Part IV, which this Article 
advocates as the proper and healthy development trend for cross-
border arbitration and judicial assistance between the two sides. 
 
                                                
69 Keeneye II, [2012] at 1 H.K.L.R.D. 627. 
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 An Overview of the Caseload Change 
Below are two tables compiled on basis of the data collected at 
the Hong Kong International Arbitration Center (the “HKIAC”), 
which show the numbers of cases received by the Hong Kong courts 
where enforcement of the Mainland China awards are sought in 
Hong Kong, the rate of challenges to enforcement, and the rate of 
such challenges being successful. Table 2 is a breakdown 
illustration of Table 1. Both Tables (Tables 1 and 2) will be 
extensively referred to in the subsequent discussions in order to 
examine the four different phases in which the Hong Kong courts 
have treated the enforcement of the Mainland awards differently.  
 
 
 Table 1: Enforcement of Mainland China Awards in 
Hong Kong since the Handover 
 
 Table 2: Breakdown of Table 1 
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Year No. of 
cases 
where 
enforce
ment 
was 
sought 
No. of 
cases 
where 
enforcem
ent was 
challeng
ed 
Challe
nge 
rate 
No. of 
success
ful 
challen
ges 
Challe
nge 
success 
rate 
Enforceme
nt rate 
1997 9 4 44% 1 25% 89% 
1998 0 0 N/A 0 N/A N/A 
1999 0 0 N/A 0 N/A N/A 
2000 30 10 33% 2 20% 93% 
2001 11 4 36% 1 25% 91% 
2002 7 0 0% 0 N/A 100% 
2003 10 1 10% 0 0% 100% 
2004 3 0 0% 0 N/A 100% 
2005 4 0 0% 0 N/A 100% 
2006 6 2 33% 0 0% 100% 
2007 4 0 0% 0 N/A 100% 
2008 0 0 N/A 0 N/A N/A 
2009 9 0 0% 0 N/A 100% 
2010 6 2 33% 1 50% 83% 
2011 6 1 17% 0 0% 100% 
2012 6 2 33% 0 0% 100% 
Total 111 26 23% 5 19% 95% 
Source: Data collected at the HKIAC70 
 
 1997-1999: The Dark Age of Cross-border Arbitration and 
the Significance of the Hebei Judgment 
 The Dark Age of Cross-border Arbitration 
As has been outlined in the previous discussion, before the 
Mutual Arrangement was put into place, the Hong Kong courts 
                                                
70  Data compiled by the author from data provided at the HKIAC’s website. See 
Enforcement of Arbitration Awards in Hong Kong, HKIAC, 
http://www.hkiac.org/index.php/en/hkiac-statistics/enforcement-of-awards (last visited 
Dec. 5, 2013). 
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generally had a hands-off attitude towards the enforcement of 
Mainland China awards.71 In the SAR courts’ first case of an 
enforcement of a Mainland China arbitral award post-handover, i.e. 
the Ng Fung Hong case, Judge Kaplan held that there was no legal 
basis in which a Mainland China arbitral award could be enforced 
by the Hong Kong courts, after the misapplication of the New York 
Convention since the handover.72 Working on the basis of Article 8 
of the Basic Law that the laws previously in force in Hong Kong 
shall be maintained, with a bit of creative judicial interpretation, the 
courts could have probably enforced a Mainland China arbitral 
award as a “domestic award” under Section 2GG of the then 
Arbitration Ordinance (Cap. 341).73 However, the judiciary decided 
to defer the issue to the legislature. Unfortunately, the legislature 
did not react quickly either. In combination with the Ng Fung Hong 
case, the cross-border arbitration system entered an almost-two-year 
limbo. 
As is shown in Table 2, before the promulgation of the Mutual 
Arrangement, for the period from 1997 to 1999, there were nine 
Mainland China arbitral awards sought to be enforced in Hong 
Kong in 1997, 74  but most of them were awards which were 
instituted prior to the handover on July 1st in order to be decided 
before the New York Convention was rendered inapplicable 
between Hong Kong and China. Four of those enforcement 
applications were opposed and only one opposition succeeded.75 
The case where enforcement challenge was successful was 
Guangdong Overseas Shenzhen Co. Ltd v. Yao Shun Group 
International.76 The case concerned a CIETAC arbitration in 1996 
and the award was set aside on the basis that procedural injustices 
were found to have occurred.77 The CIETAC tribunal made an 
award in favor of the claimant, and enforcement was sought at the 
CFI in Hong Kong.78 The respondent opposed the award under the 
premise that the award was made on the same day that the arbitral 
tribunal had received the respondent’s response to the claimant’s 
                                                
71 See discussion supra pp. 4-7. 
72 Ng Fung Hong Ltd., [1998] at 1 H.K.L.R.D. 156-57; see discussion supra. 
73 See Ng Fung Hong Ltd., [1998] at 1 H.K.L.R.D. 156; see also discussion supra. 
74 See supra Table 2. 
75 See supra Table 1. 
76 Guangdong Overseas Shenzhen Co. Ltd. v. Yao Shun Grp. Int’l, [1998] 1 H.K.C. 451 
(C.F.I.). 
77 Id. para. 9. 
78 Id. para. 1-2. 
2013]   CROSS-BORDER ARBITRATION IN HONG KONG WITH CHINA       63 
 
written submissions on an issue.79 Although the tribunal seemed to 
have directed that oral submissions would be received after written 
submissions, an award was made without further hearing.80 The 
award was then set aside by Judge Findlay under the reasoning that 
the respondent’s right to be heard was infringed.81 He held that the 
tribunal could not have properly considered the submissions, and if 
it had intended to proceed without considering those submissions, it 
should have informed the respondent.82 
The Guangdong case aside, the real intrigue in this period is the 
dearth of cross-border arbitration in Hong Kong. As Table 1 shows, 
in the years 1998 and 1999, there were no applications to the Hong 
Kong courts for the enforcement of Mainland China arbitral awards 
at all.83 The reason was simply due to the disapplication of the New 
York Convention as demonstrated by the Ng Fung Hong case in 
1998.84 On the other hand, despite the absence of cross-border 
enforcement mechanism, it was, however, in this particular period 
that Hong Kong’s leading case on arbitration law was born.  
Before the Mainland China-Hong Kong Mutual Arrangement 
entered into force on February 1, 2000, the basis of Hong Kong’s 
stance on enforcement of arbitral awards, particularly enforcement 
of the Mainland China awards, had been set up in early 1999, in the 
Court of Final Appeal case, Hebei Import & Export Corp. v. Polytek 
Engineering Co. Ltd.85 
 The Hebei Judgment 
In the Hebei case, a CIETAC arbitral tribunal made an award in 
favor of the claimant, Hebei, in March 1996.86 Four months later, in 
July 1996, Hebei obtained ex parte leave to enforce the award at the 
CFI in Hong Kong. Polytek, the respondent, then sought to resist 
enforcement.87 The hearing was somewhat delayed, as the bench 
determined that the hearing should be delayed pending the 
determination by the supervisory court of the arbitration, i.e. the 
                                                
79 Id. para. 3. 
80 Id. para. 8. 
81 Id., para. 8-9. 
82 Id. para. 9. 
83 See supra Table 1. 
84 See Ng Fung Hong Ltd., [1998] at 1 H.K.L.R.D. 156. 
85 Hebei, [1999] at 2 H.K.C.F.A.R. 125.  
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
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Beijing No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court, concerning an 
application to set aside the award in question at the seat of 
arbitration.88 The application to set aside was finally dismissed by 
the Beijing Court, and the Hong Kong proceedings resumed, where 
the CFI dismissed the application to set aside and allowed the 
enforcement on May 15, 1997, just before the handover.89 Because 
the application for enforcement was made prior to the handover, the 
CIETAC award had therefore been considered a Convention award 
despite the fact that it was rendered in Mainland China, which is 
why this case was reported during the legal abyss period.90 
The main procedural injustice in Hebei, as complained by the 
respondent, was that the presiding arbitrator and expert witness 
appointed by the tribunal had inspected allegedly-defective 
equipment at issue in the case in the presence of the claimant’s 
technicians but not the respondent’s. 91  In association, the 
respondents did not receive proper notice of the inspection, were 
refused a further hearing subsequent to the inspection, and were not 
allowed to call the manufacturer to give evidence on the findings of 
the report of the inspection.92 It was thus complained that the award 
was tainted by apparent bias and violated public policy of Hong 
Kong.93 Despite the fact that the supervising court in Mainland 
China, the Beijing No.2 Intermediate People’s Court, refused to 
entertain the respondent’s complaints, on appeal, in January 1998, 
the CA ruled against the enforcement of the award on the basis of 
public policy.94 
The case went further to the Court of Final Appeal (the “CFA”). 
On February 9, the CFA unanimously allowed the appeal and 
demonstrated the pro-enforcement approach. It was found that the 
opportunity of “a party to present his case and a determination by an 
impartial and independent tribunal” is basic to the notions of justice 
and morality in Hong Kong.95 However, in determining whether 
what happened in the case was contrary to such notions, the CFA 
                                                
88 Id. 
89 Hebei (No 2), at [1998] 1 H.K.C. 195. 
90 Id. 
91 See Hebei, [1999] at 2 H.K.C.F.A.R. 119. 
92 Id. at 125. 
93 Id. at 112.  
94 Hebei (No 2), [1998] at 1 H.K.C. 210. 
95 Robert Morgan & Man Sin Yeung, Enforcement of Foreign and Mainland Arbitral 
Awards in Hong Kong: Med-Arb, Public Policy and Waiver, 2012 ASIAN DISP. R. 30, 31 
(discussing Hebei, [1999] at 2 H.K.C.F.A.R. 118). 
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found that the respondents were able to present their case. It was 
said that the inspection at the end user’s factory and the presentation 
by the technicians in the absence of the respondent were procedures 
which in Hong Kong might be considered unacceptable.  However, 
it was held that, by inaction, the respondent had waived his right to 
complain about the irregularity.96 
On the point of waiver, the CFA held “that refusal by a 
supervisory court at the seat of arbitration [(i.e. the Beijing Court)] 
to set aside an award would not debar [the party] from resisting 
enforcement of the award in Hong Kong on the same ground,”97 as 
“public policy reason in a supervisory court may be different from a 
court of enforcement. The position would, however, be different if a 
party had failed to raise [the challenge] before the supervisory court; 
it would then be estopped from raising that point before the court of 
enforcement.”98  
The Hebei case is a leading authority. It is famous for 
prescribing Hong Kong’s standard for setting aside awards based on 
the public policy ground. Moreover, being the apex of Hong Kong’s 
judiciary enjoying high judicial autonomy under the “one country, 
two systems” principle, the CFA had, for the first time since the 
handover, dealt with public policy issues concerning Mainland 
China arbitration practice with detailed explanations and guidance. 
As a decision made before the conclusion of the Mutual 
Arrangement, the CFA placed its emphasis on adherence to the 
fundamental principle of the New York Convention to encourage 
the recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements and 
awards in cross-border commercial transactions. Therefore, using 
public policy as a legal device to safeguard the integrity of the 
justice system of the enforcing jurisdiction such as in Hong Kong 
should be given a narrow construction. The “narrow construction” 
was elaborated by Non-Permanent Judge Sir Anthony Mason as 
such: 
[T]he object of the Convention was to encourage the 
recognition and enforcement of commercial 
arbitration agreements in international contracts and 
to unify the standards by which agreements to 
arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are 
                                                
96 Hebei, [1999] at 2 H.K.C.F.A.R. 122. 
97 Morgan & Yeung, supra note 94, at 30. 
98 Morgan & Yeung, supra note 94, at 30 (discussing Hebei, [1999] 2 H.K.C.F.A.R. 111). 
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enforced. In order to ensure the attainment of that 
object without excessive intervention on the part of 
courts of enforcement, the provisions of art V [of the 
Convention], notably art V2(b) relating to public 
policy, have been given a narrow construction. It has 
been generally accepted that the expression ‘contrary 
to the public policy of that country’ in art V2(b) 
means ‘contrary to the fundamental conceptions of 
morality and justice’ of the forum.99 
 
Permanent Judge Litton stated that “courts should [also] recognize 
the validity of decisions of foreign arbitral tribunals as a matter of 
comity, and give effect to them, unless to do so would . . . [be 
against the forum court’s] most basic notions of morality and 
justice,” and that a public policy objection could only be grounded 
on extreme injustice.100 Quoting Permanent Judge Bokhary on the 
proper understanding of public policy: 
In regard to the refusal of enforcement of awards on 
public policy grounds, there are references in the 
cases and texts to what has been called ‘international 
public policy.’ Does this mean some standard 
common to all civilized nations? Or does it mean 
those elements of a State’s own public policy which 
are so fundamental to its notions of justice that its 
courts feel obliged to apply the same not only to 
purely internal matters but even to matters with a 
foreign element by which other States are affected? I 
think that it should be taken to mean the latter.101 
 
Hence, for an award to be denied it must be fundamentally offensive 
to that particular jurisdiction’s notion of justice.102 Non-Permanent 
Judge Sir Anthony Mason added his agreement with the opinion 
that the public policy ground could only be applied to a situation 
“contrary to the fundamental conceptions of morality and justice of 
                                                
99 Hebei, [1999] at 2 H.K.C.F.A.R. 139 (citations omitted). 
100 Id. at 118. 
101 Id. at 123. 
102 Id. at 123-24. 
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Hong Kong.”103 In this regard all the justices firmly took the same 
stand on the application criterion of public policy in Hong Kong.104  
The Hebei judgment shows that the Hong Kong courts are 
predisposed towards enforcement of arbitration awards. The courts 
are also willing to overlook small amounts of inequity as long as the 
injustice caused is curable, severable, or is not so fundamentally 
offensive as to shock Hong Kong’s most basic notions of justice. 
The Hebei standard, as we see in cases from subsequent years, has 
made challenges under public policy grounds difficult and deterred 
challenges on pure technical grounds.  
In the meantime, the Hebei judgment had been made entirely in 
accordance with the New York Convention. Because the Mutual 
Arrangement has largely followed the contents of the Convention, 
courts in Hong Kong have been able to employ Convention 
jurisprudence, in particular the Hebei ratio, in the post-Mutual-
Arrangement cross-border arbitration system and in almost all 
subsequent arbitration enforcement proceedings in Hong Kong.105 
As will be demonstrated by following discussions, it is generally 
believed that the pro-enforcement approach laid down by Hebei was 
well suited to face the new political reality of reunification.  
 
 2000-2001: The Case Rebound by Riding the Wave of Hebei  
With the Mutual Arrangement taking effect on February 1, 2000, 
the cross-border arbitration activities between the two sides were 
revived. In accordance with Article 10 of the Arrangement, which 
was later incorporated into Section 40G of the then-Hong Kong 
Arbitration Ordinance (Cap.341), Mainland China arbitration 
awards which had been refused enforcement during the period of 
legal abyss (i.e. between July 1, 1997 and February 1, 2000) were 
                                                
103 Id. at 139. 
104 In this case Chief Justice Li and Permanent Judge Ching did not write their separate 
opinions, but agreed with Non-Permanent Judge Sir Anthony Mason on his judgment. See, 
id. at 116, 121. 
105The Hebei case was prevalently cited by many courts in the common law world. For 
example, the Hebei case was cited in the New Zealand case of Downer –Hill Joint Venture 
v. Gov’t of Fiji [2005] 1 NZLR 554, the Australian case of Traxys Europe SA v. Balaji 
Coke Indus. PVT Ltd. (N0 2) [2012] 291 ALR 99, and the English Supreme Court case of 
Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co. v. Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Gov’t 
of Pakistan [2009] EWCA (Civ) 755. 
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allowed to make fresh applications for enforcement.106 As such, 
2000 was the year in which the biggest portion of applications to 
enforce Mainland China awards was made in history, with a total of 
30 applications being made that year.107 In the next year, 2001, 11 
applications to enforce Mainland China awards were made, which, 
although much less than the previous year, is the second-highest 
total in application volume over the one-and-a-half decades since 
the handover.108  
Not only was the enforcement application volume the largest 
ever in these two years, the volume of cases where enforcement was 
opposed, as of the year end of 2012, was also the greatest, with 10 
enforcement applications being challenged in 2000 and another 4 
challenges in 2001.109 Since then, there have never been more than 
two cases in any single year in which applications to enforce 
Mainland China arbitral awards were opposed.110 It is interesting to 
note, however, that although the opposition rate was high in the 
years after the Mutual Arrangement was promulgated, the success 
rate of those challenges was quite low; hence, the enforcement rate 
of Mainland China awards in Hong Kong remained as high as above 
90%.111 This is because the pro-enforcement attitude of Hong Kong 
courts towards Convention awards, as espoused in Hebei, had been 
equally applied towards the enforcement of Mainland China arbitral 
awards, as we will see in a chain of cases which were adjudicated 
shortly after Mainland China awards became enforceable in Hong 
Kong under the bilateral agreement. 
One of the very first cases where a Mainland China award was 
sought to be enforced in Hong Kong under the Mutual Arrangement 
was Shanghai City Foundation Works Corp. v. Sunlink Ltd. 112 The 
Shanghai case concerned an arbitration award made by CIETAC in 
October 1999, but, due to the lack of a cross-border enforcement 
scheme, the CIETAC award was unable to be enforced in Hong 
Kong until after February 2000.113 In the case, the respondent 
alleged that enforcement of the award should be refused, as there 
                                                
106 See Mutual Arrangement, art. 10; Hong Kong Arbitration Amendment Ordinance, 
(2000) Cap. 341, § 40 (G). See also supra notes 50-51. 
107 See supra Tables 1 & 2.  
108 See supra Table 2. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Shanghai City Found. Works Corp. v. Sunlink Ltd., [2001] 3 H.K.C. 521 (C.F.I.). 
113 Id. 
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was an oral agreement between the parties providing that whatever 
the outcome of the arbitration, the settlement of the outstanding 
sums would only be payable after certain other conditions were 
fulfilled.114 The court refused to withhold enforcement of the award 
to allow oral testimony as to the existence of the alleged 
agreement.115 Applying Hebei, it was held that the respondent’s 
failure to raise its challenge at the supervisory court in Mainland 
China amounted to an estoppel or a defeat of bona fide such as to 
justify enforcement of the award.116 
Although the respondent referred the court to the case of J.J. 
Agro (P) Industries Ltd. v. Texuna International Ltd., in which case 
Judge Kaplan, in 1992, decided to hear oral testimony in relation to 
an allegation of fraud, it was held that the fact that the case was the 
only authority the respondent referred to indicated that acceding to 
an application to hear oral evidence is the exception rather than the 
rule. 117 The court found that such matters of legal validity were 
matters best left to the supervisory court, i.e. court in Mainland 
China, unless the challenge to enforcement involved matters which 
would invoke Hong Kong’s public policy.118 However, although 
public policy was also pleaded to challenge the award enforcement, 
applying Hebei, the high threshold of Hong Kong’s most basic 
notions of morality and justice had not been met.119 
Another noteworthy case in this period was Shantou Zheng Ping 
Xu Yueli Shu Kuao Trading Co. Ltd. v. Wesco Polymers Ltd.120 The 
case concerned a CIETAC award in 2001 over a contract for the 
supply of goods.121 The dispute was straightforward. What was 
noteworthy was a comment made by Judge Burrell in the case, on 
the clear application of the Convention jurisprudence to the 
enforcement of Mainland China arbitral awards following the 
enactment of the cross-border Mutual Arrangement: 
In my judgment, no extra burden lies on the plaintiff 
which makes his task more difficult than it would 
otherwise have been [if it was a Convention award]. 
                                                
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. (construing J.J. Agro (P) Indus. Ltd v. Texuna Int’l Ltd., [1994] 1 H.K.L.R. 89). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Shantou Zheng Ping Xu Yueli Shu Kuao Trading Co. v. Wesco Polymers Ltd., [2002] 
H.K.E.C. 76 (C.F.I.). 
121 Id. 
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The Plaintiff starts therefore with the advantage of the 
strong pro-enforcement bias afforded by the 
legislation.122 
 
This shows and reinforces Hong Kong courts’ pro-enforcement 
attitude towards Mainland China arbitral awards, and the courts’ 
unwillingness to differentiate between the thresholds of challenges 
to enforcement applications of Mainland China awards and 
Convention awards. It is generally believed that this pro-
enforcement approach, as laid down by Hebei, has been well taken 
to properly redefine the cross-border arbitration relationship 
between Hong Kong and Mainland China after the reunification. 
  
 
 
 2002-2009: The Calm under the Pro-Enforcement Policy 
In the period from 2002 to 2009, courts in Hong Kong kept 
riding the wave of Hebei in virtually all enforcement challenges, 
particularly those challenges against Mainland China arbitral 
awards. The judiciary had formed a clear and express pro-
enforcement attitude. Based on the figures in Table 2, it can be seen 
that there were 43 Mainland China awards seeking enforcement in 
Hong Kong in the years 2002 till 2009, but only 3 cases had met 
with challenges and none of these challenges had been successful, 
making the enforcement rate reach the historic high of 100% for 
eight years.123 This is a stunning reversal in attitude by parties 
facing unfavorable Mainland China arbitral awards, as compared to 
the two previous years, during which 41 enforcement applications 
were made and 14 were challenged before the Hong Kong courts.124 
Despite the calm and light caseload (on challenges) from 2002 till 
2009, a couple of high quality judgments were delivered which 
clarified the proper role of Hong Kong courts in cross-border 
enforcement actions, particularly on the point of public policy. 
One of the challenges concerned a CFA decision on public 
policy. In 2007, in Unruh v. Seeberger, “it was alleged that a 
Mainland China arbitral award should not be enforced because it 
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was made in circumstances involving a champertous agreement, 
which was illegal in Hong Kong.”125 In balancing public policies 
between the supervisory jurisdiction (Mainland China) and 
enforcement jurisdiction (Hong Kong), it was held that it was 
improper for the Hong Kong courts to impose its public policy 
against champerty on mature commercial parties who have chosen 
to arbitrate in a jurisdiction where champerty is not contrary to 
public policy (i.e. Mainland China).126 
Another high-profile case against Mainland China arbitral award 
enforcement was made in 2008 in Xiamen Xinjingdi Group Ltd. v. 
Eton Properties Ltd. & Anor where the role of the Hong Kong 
courts in enforcement actions was properly explained. 127  The 
Xiamen case concerned a disputed termination by the Hong Kong 
respondents of a contract, which allowed the Mainland Chinese 
claimant to develop and receive profit from a piece of land of a 
holding company owned by the respondent. 128  Arbitration 
proceedings commenced before CIETAC in August 2005.129 The 
respondent defended its case by stating that the agreement was 
contrary to Mainland Chinese law and thus unenforceable, and that 
performance was impossible as the respondent had begun 
construction work on the land.130 The respondent then applied to set 
aside leave to enforce the arbitral award, claiming that to enforce it 
would be against public policy, as it was fundamentally offensive to 
the court’s notion of justice to order it to perform the award when 
the applicant was not ready, willing or able to perform its 
obligations under the agreement.131 The case eventually reached the 
CA.132 However, it was at the CFI and through Judge Reyes that 
much analysis was given on the standard of arbitration review and 
enforcement policy in Hong Kong, and such analysis was agreed to 
in the CA.133 
                                                
125 Weixia Gu & Xian Chu Zhang, The Keeneye Case: Rethinking the Content of Public 
Policy in Cross-Border Arbitration between Hong Kong and Mainland China, 42 H.K. L.J. 
1001, 1012 (2012); Unruh v. Seeberger, [2007] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 414, 440 (C.F.A). 
126 Id. at 454. 
127 Xiamen Xinjingdi Grp. Ltd. v. Eton Props. Ltd., [2008] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 972 (C.F.I). 
128 Id. at 976-77. 
129 Id. at 977. 
130 Id. at 988. 
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132 See Xiamen Xinjingdi Grp. Ltd. v. Eton Props. Ltd., [2009] 4 HKLRD 353 (C.A.). 
133 See id. at 355. 
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According to Judge Reyes, an enforcement court only has two 
tasks to make a decision.134 First, it has to determine whether an 
award is valid.135 Second, it has to determine whether there exists a 
valid ground to refuse the award’s enforcement.136 If the award is 
valid and there exists no valid ground to refuse enforcement, the 
award should be mechanistically enforced.137 The enforcement court 
needs not bother itself with the reasoning or circumstances in which 
the award was made.138 Hence, the court’s role should be “although 
by no means entirely ‘mechanistic’, ‘as mechanistic as possible’.”139 
Consistent with the “mechanistic” principle, Judge Reyes held 
that unless an award was plainly “incapable of performance, such 
that it would be obviously oppressive to order a party to comply 
with it”, the court could not hold that to enforce the award would be 
contrary to public policy.140 If it was merely arguable that the award 
was incapable of performance, it is incumbent on the parties that the 
issue be raised at the courts of supervision;141 it was held that it is 
not the place of enforcement courts “to go behind the award,” nor to 
“explore the reasoning,” and allow the re-opening of what the 
arbitrators had already decided.142 If the issue was not raised at the 
courts of supervision, it was not for the courts of enforcement to 
second-guess how the courts of supervision might have decided. 
The Hong Kong judgment and the “mechanic” principle had quoted 
an earlier English Court of Appeal judgment, C v D.143 The English 
Court held that:  
[A]n agreement as to the seat of arbitration is 
analogous to an exclusive jurisdiction clause. Any 
claim for a remedy going to the . . . validity of an 
existing interim or final award is agreed to be made 
only in the courts of the place designated as to the 
seat of the arbitration.144  
 
                                                
134 See Xiamen Xinjingdi Grp., [2008] at 4 H.K.L.R.D. 982-88. 
135 See id. 
136 See id. 
137 Id. at 982. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 973. 
141 Id. at 984. 
142 Id. at 980, 983. 
143 Id. at 972, 984 (quoting C v. D, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 1282, [17]). 
144 C v. D, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 1282, [17] (quoting A v. B [2006] EWHC (Comm) 2006, 
[111]). 
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 It seems that the Hong Kong position on enforcement and 
public policy towards Mainland China arbitral awards, up to the 
Xiamen case, has been consistently in a cautious manner.145 The 
court generally follows the narrow interpretation of public policy, 
although in the meantime parties are reminded of the importance of 
raising procedural objections at the supervisory court in a timeous 
manner.146  
As the line of the above cases shows, the Hong Kong courts 
respect the fact that when parties agree to arbitration, it is their 
intention that their dispute be settled and argued by arbitration and 
not in court. Hence, any error in judgment by arbitration would be 
insufficient to counterbalance the public policy of pro-enforcement, 
unless there is some substantial injustice to render the enforcement 
repugnant.147 
For reasons of comity between the two jurisdictions and the 
unreasonableness of requiring Mainland China arbitrations to 
adhere to the strict standards of Hong Kong law, Hong Kong courts 
have closely scrutinized all claims challenging enforcement.148 The 
courts have placed a high threshold of public policy by requiring the 
alleged infringement to be fundamentally contrary to Hong Kong’s 
most basic sense of justice and morality.149 “[T]he high threshold 
set by Hong Kong courts may have acted as a potent disincentive 
against frivolous claims on public policy, and to protect the 
operation of the arbitration systems, both in Hong Kong and with 
Mainland China.” 150  However, the test has been controversial 
because parties with genuine issues of public policy and who are 
subject to irregular awards, now find it “difficult to avail themselves 
of the public policy exception to enforcement.”151 
A most recent Hong Kong decision considers public policy-
based procedural objections to the “enforcement of a Mainland 
China arbitral award that was made following the hybrid process of 
                                                
145 See generally Hebei, [1999] at 2 H.K.C.F.A.R. 111; Unruh, [2007] at 2 H.K.L.R.D. 414; 
Xiamen Xinjingdi Grp., [2008] at 4 H.K.L.R.D. 972; see also Gu & Zhang, supra note 124, 
at 1013. 
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[2001] at 3 H.K.C. 521; see also Gu & Zhang, supra note 124. 
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mediation and arbitration (the ‘med-arb’).”152 The “Keeneye case,” 
(Gao Haiyan v Keeneye Holdings Ltd.), decided by the CA in early 
December 2011, in which the appeal against the ruling of the CFI 
was allowed, 153  represents the latest judicial approach of 
enforcement of Mainland China awards in Hong Kong.154 As will 
be demonstrated in following discussions, the Keeneye case throws 
the judicial standard in enforcement proceedings, particularly with 
respect to the enforcement of a Mainland China award in Hong 
Kong, into confusion. 
 
 
 
 2010 and onwards: The Controversy and Discontent since 
Keeneye 
 The Keeneye Case 
In the period covering 2010 to 2012, as reflected in Table 2, 
although there were altogether five enforcement challenges against 
Mainland China awards, only one challenge was successful. On the 
other hand, it is in this period, after almost ten years of calm in the 
cross-border arbitration regime, that the future uncertainty of 
whether the high standard of Hong Kong courts in cross-border 
enforcement actions should be lowered to defer to the Mainland 
China arbitration status quo and its developing rule-of-law reality 
has been unveiled. What is striking in this period is a single case, 
the Keeneye, in which the disparity between the rulings of the CFI 
and CA seemed to make the public policy approach not as clear cut 
as before (or more nuanced now) when the Mainland China 
arbitration practice holds a standard of integrity which is lower than 
that required in Hong Kong.155  
On April 12, 2011, Judge Reyes at the CFI denied enforcement 
of a Mainland China arbitral award by reason that it infringed Hong 
Kong’s public policy, because it was made under circumstances 
                                                
152 Id. 
153 Keeneye II, [2012] at 1 H.K.L.R.D. 627; see Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd. 
(Keeneye I), [2011] 3 H.K.C. 157 (C.F.I.). 
154 Gu & Zhang, supra note 124, at 1003-04. 
155 Keeneye II, [2012] at 1 H.K.L.R.D. 627 (C.A.); Keeneye I, [2011] at 3 H.K.C. 157 
(C.F.I.). 
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indicating apparent bias.156 The reasoning of the case is secondary 
to how the arbitration was conducted. In the dispute settlement, 
mediation was conducted as part of the arbitration process, i.e. med-
arb.157  “The bias was found to arise from a private meeting between 
an arbitrator nominated by the applicants and the Secretary General 
of the Xi’an Arbitration Commission (the “XAC”) and an affiliate 
of the respondents, who was told to ‘work on’ [(做工作)] a RMB 
250 million proposal” at a dinner table in a hotel with the 
respondents in the med-arb process.158 “The respondents eventually 
refused to pay the proposed settlement and proceeded to 
arbitration.”159 The tribunal ruled against the respondent, but the 
award amounted to only RMB 50 million.160  
The Arbitration Rules of the XAC expressly provided for 
mediation to take place within the arbitration process (i.e. med-arb). 
Pursuant to Article 37 of the Rules, med-arb should be conducted 
“by the arbitral tribunal or the presiding arbitrator,” though it goes 
on to say that “[w]ith the approval of the parties, any third party 
may be invited to assist the mediation, or they may act as mediator.” 
161 After the award was rendered, the respondents challenged the 
award to the supervisory court, the Xi’an Intermediate Court, on 
ground of bias and breaches of the proper procedure of med-arb 
under the XAC Rules.162 
The Xi’an court found against the claims, ruling that there was 
no evidence of bias, no breach of the arbitral rules, and upheld the 
award. 163  The respondents then resisted the award at the 
enforcement stage in Hong Kong.164 
As the presiding judge at the CFI trial, Judge Reyes refused to 
follow the decision of the Xi’an Court. The CFI held that although 
the Xi’an Court, by its standards, found the private meeting with 
“working on” parties to be entirely fine and the subsequent award 
perfectly valid, in accordance with Hebei, the Hong Kong courts 
                                                
156 Keeneye I, [2011] at 3 HKC 157 at paras. 3, 5-7, 101-103. 
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158 Gu & Zhang, supra note 124, at 1005; Keeneye I, [2011] at 3 HKC 157 at para. 22. 
159 Gu & Zhang, supra note 124, at 1005. 
160 See Keeneye I, [2011] at 3 HKC 157 at para 68. 
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could apply their own standards when deciding whether an award 
should be refused under public policy grounds. 165 The CFI held that 
a med-arb process may run into self-evident difficulties [with 
respect to] impartiality and the risk of apparent bias arising from an 
arbitrator also acting as mediator.166 Moreover, the phrase “work 
on” insinuated that the party might have been actively pushed to 
accept the settlement proposal.167 As such, it was held that when the 
circumstances surrounding an arbitrator would cause a fair-minded 
observer to apprehend a real risk of bias, an award made in that 
situation could be refused enforcement under the public policy 
exception of Hong Kong.168 The CFI thus concluded that the med-
arb conducted, while insufficient to prove actual bias, when 
combined with the contrasting result of the RMB 50 million and the 
proposed RMB 250 million settlement during mediation, can lead a 
reasonable bystander to apprehend bias as a real possibility in the 
making of the award.169 
However, upon appeal, Vice President Tang (“Tang VP”), 
Justice of Appeal Fok and Justice Sakhrani at the CA unanimously 
allowed the appeal and reinstated the award.170 
At the CA trial, in leading the bench, Tang VP stressed and 
reapplied the usual strict policy of disallowing the refusal of 
enforcement of arbitral awards except in most exceptional 
circumstances threatening Hong Kong’s morality and justice.171 The 
CA agreed with the CFI that Hong Kong can apply its own public 
policy in deciding whether outside arbitral awards are to be denied 
enforcement in Hong Kong. The CA was, however, concerned that 
deference should be paid to supervisory court in Mainland China 
and to the fact that the Mainland supervisory court had previously 
found that there was no finding of bias and that the med-arb process 
was properly proceeded with according to their standards. Hence, 
the CA blamed the CFI for not having placed enough weight on the 
decision of the Xi’an Court.172 After considering all the facts of the 
case, the CA held that a Mainland China court would be in a better 
position to decide on the properness of the procedure where the 
                                                
165 Morgan & Yeung, supra note 94, at paras 28-31. 
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court saw no bias and no complaint about the venue had been made 
to the Xi’an Court.173 Thus guided, in deference to the supervisory 
court, the CA reversed the CFI’s ruling, concluding that apparent 
bias had not been sufficiently proven to warrant a refusal to enforce 
the Mainland China award.174  
While the CA came to this conclusion on basis of the common 
principles of finality of arbitration and comity of cross-border 
arbitration, and most directly, the English authority of Minmetals 
Germany GmbH v Ferco Steel Ltd.,175 its application is somewhat 
controversial. The CA decision was questioned on whether it has 
lowered its standards too far in the court’s usual policy of refusing 
to enforce biased awards, in order to protect the vibrancy of the 
cross-border arbitration system.176     
 The Controversies 
The Keeneye case has fleshed out a new wave of discussions on 
public policy that the Hong Kong common law mindset has had 
against the Mainland China style arbitration. 177  The first 
controversy is on the issue of bias and its associated due process 
concerns, and the second is on whose standard of bias should be 
employed when deciding whether the public policy of Hong Kong 
was infringed by the purported bias. Viewing the two controversies 
together, it seems that, since Keeneye, Hong Kong courts have lost 
clarity in their enforcement standard and the cross-border arbitration 
order has been driven towards Mainland China standards. 
Regarding the first controversy, the problem of bias in the med-
arb context is latent. In cases where the roles of mediator and 
arbitrator are assumed by the same person, when mediation fails and 
parties proceed to arbitration, the mediator-turned-arbitrator may 
become privy to confidential information not placed before the 
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arbitral tribunal but only available during mediation, and hence 
loses his impartiality.178 The Keeneye case highlights the difficulties 
inherent in med-arb proceedings, particularly with respect to the 
mode of mediation. This is crucial in the Mainland China context, 
as mediation is a much relied on dispute resolution system and 
parties are highly encouraged to adopt mediation within arbitration.  
Moreover, the mediator-turned-arbitrator may become “attached 
to any settlement proposals he may have made” and would try to 
“prove himself right during the arbitration.”179 It is the combination 
of these factors which makes it easy for an arbitrator to lose his 
impartiality after having assumed the role of mediator. To counter 
this possibility, many “common law arbitrators therefore tend to 
refuse to participate in med-arb, so that they can avoid appearing to 
be biased, even if they [might be] confident that they can act 
professionally and adjudicate without bias.”180 It is this trend that 
“was the main thrust of the challenge of the award in the Keeneye 
case.”181 
At the CFI, Judge Reyes held that if an award were found to be 
tainted by the appearance of bias, the enforcement “would be an 
affront to this Court’s sense of justice”182 and hence, an award made 
in that situation could be refused enforcement under the public 
policy exception of Hong Kong. 183 The point on bias was further 
investigated in the CA, which “found the Hebei case to be the 
definitive authority.”184 On the standard of apparent bias, Permanent 
Judge Bokhary found: 
[S]hort of actual bias, I do not think that the Hong 
Kong courts would be justified in refusing 
enforcement of a Convention award on public policy 
grounds as soon as appearances fall short of what we 
insist upon in regard to impartiality where domestic 
cases or arbitrations are concerned. . . . After all, 
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where the appearance of bias is strong enough, it can 
lead to an inference that actual bias existed.185 
 
“From this quote, it seems that only the finding of actual bias would 
be sufficient to raise the public policy ground to resist the 
enforcement” in Hong Kong.186 In Hebei, however, Non-Permanent 
Judge Sir Anthony Mason at page 139 said: “[T]he opportunity of a 
party to present his case and a determination by an impartial and 
independent tribunal which is not influenced, or seen to be 
influenced, by private communications are basic to the notions of 
justice and morality in Hong Kong.”187 
It seems that Non-Permanent Judge Sir Anthony Mason, 
espousing a standard different from Permanent Judge Bokhary’s 
threshold, was saying that “apparent bias could also be a ground 
under public policy to refuse enforcement.” 188  Despite the 
seemingly contrary views, Tang VP at the CA, in his leading 
judgment in Keeneye, did not find any conflict between the two 
quotes.189 Unfortunately, Tang VP has not confirmed whether an 
appearance of bias strong enough that actual bias can be inferred is 
sufficient to pass the court’s current threshold of the basic notion of 
justice in Hong Kong. It is still unknown to what extent the apparent 
bias can be justified in order to deny the enforcement of an award. 
The standard is controversial in enforcement challenges when 
awards are made in circumstances involving some sort of apparent 
bias which is not uncommon in Mainland China as a developing 
rule-of-law jurisdiction with less respect for due process. 
The associated problem with bias is the likely violation of due 
process. “[A] violation of due process may occur, as the additional 
information obtained in the private caucus of mediation may affect 
the mediator-turned-arbitrator’s mind without the other party having 
the right to question the validity and accuracy of what was said in 
the caucus.”190  Fairly speaking, it is not that when an arbitrator acts 
as a mediator, he is already under suspicions of bias and impartiality, 
but it is reasonable to say that arbitrators acting as mediators are 
                                                
185 Keeneye II, [2012] at 1 H.K.L.R.D. 660-61 (quoting Hebei, [1999] at 2 H.K.C.F.A.R. 
124). 
186 Gu & Zhang, supra note 124, at 1020. 
187 Hebei, [1999] at 2. H.K.C.F.A.R. 139. 
188 Gu & Zhang, supra note 124, at 1020. 
189 Keeneye II, [2012] at 1 H.K.L.R.D. 661. 
190 Gu & Zhang, supra note 124, at 1021 (citing De Vera, supra note 172). 
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under conditions where it is easy to develop a due process concern. 
Internationally, the problem is often resolved by requiring the 
arbitrator who participated in the mediation to disclose all 
information which may be relevant to the issues. For example, in 
Hong Kong, the Arbitration Ordinance requires arbitrators to 
disclose to all other parties all such confidential information 
received by him in the role as a mediator if he considers the 
information material to the arbitral proceedings.191 
Conversely, the situation is far from satisfactory in Mainland 
China. The 1994 China Arbitration Law (the “AL”) “only provides 
sweep reference to the practice of med-arb[s].”192 The AL contains 
neither “provisions disallowing private meetings (caucus), nor are 
there any provisions requiring arbitrators to disclose information 
obtained from such meetings to other parties or to the rest of the 
tribunal.” 193   The AL is further silent on whether Chinese 
“arbitrators are restricted from using their knowledge of such 
information when deciding the case afterwards” and it is not 
uncommon that mediator-turned-arbitrators would rely on the 
confidential information in making the award. 194  “Hence, the 
difference in legislative policy the two jurisdictions have towards 
the maintenance of due process is outstanding [when Mainland 
China] awards are transferred to Hong Kong seeking 
enforcement.”195    
The second controversy is even more problematic, as the CA 
removed the clarity on whose standard of apparent bias was to be 
employed when deciding whether the public policy of Hong Kong 
was infringed by the purported bias. The default position used to be 
clearly the standard of the enforcing jurisdiction, i.e. Hong Kong’s 
standard. Quoting Sir Anthony Mason in the Hebei case, “[i]t has 
been generally accepted that the expression ‘contrary to the public 
policy of that country’ in art.V2(b) [of the New York Convention] 
                                                
191 Arbitration Ordinance, (2011) Cap. 609, 13, § 33(4). 
192 Gu & Zhang, supra note 124, at 1021; Zhongcai Fa (仲裁法) [Arbitration Law] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 31, 1994, effective Sep. 
1, 1995) 1994 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 31.  Article 51 of the 
Arbitration Law only provides that if parties suggest mediation, the tribunal is obliged to 
conduct it. 
193 Gu & Zhang, supra note 124, at 1021. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
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means ‘contrary to the fundamental conceptions of morality and 
justice’ of the forum.”196 
Following principles established in Hebei, a party which 
unsuccessfully challenges an arbitral award before the supervisory 
court will not be precluded from raising the same ground before the 
enforcement court because the  public policy of the latter may well 
differ from that of the former.197 The CA, however, was concerned 
that the refusal of a supervisory court to revoke an award on the 
ground of apparent bias needs to be respected as such refusal was 
relevant to the enforcement court’s decision.198  
Thus guided, the CA chastised the CFI for not having placed 
enough weight on the decision of the supervisory court (Xi’an court) 
on the issue of apparent bias. 199 At the CA, Tang VP considered 
that the enforcement court must take into account the difference in 
mediation culture and med-arb practice between Hong Kong and 
Mainland China. Hence, the Mainland China court is better able to 
decide whether mediation by way of a dinner meeting in a hotel 
would be acceptable in Mainland China practices, where the court 
saw no bias.200 The Mainland court decision was therefore followed 
in Hong Kong because of this deference.  
Keeneye is a surprising decision, as it throws into doubt the 
seemingly-established law that when an enforcement court 
considers award challenges under the auspices of public policy, it is 
only the public policy of the forum court which is relevant.  
Although the Hong Kong courts’ application of Hong Kong’s public 
policy is tempered with competing concerns such as adopting 
Mainland China’s views as the supervisory court, that does not 
translate into deference towards its decision without balancing in 
the first place. Hong Kong courts should be slow in deferring to the 
opinion of the supervisory courts after properly balancing the pro-
enforcement policies against Hong Kong’s public policy of 
requiring arbitrations to be free from bias and conform to the 
principles of due process.201 Otherwise, the public policy exception 
of allowing enforcement courts to refuse awards according to their 
                                                
196 Hebei, [1999] at 2 H.K.C.F.A.R. 139 (quoting Parsons  & Whitemore, 508 F.2d at 974 
(2nd Cir. 1974)). 
197 Id., per Sir Anthony Mason NPJ at para 140. 
198 Keeneye II, at paras 67 and 68. 
199 Keeneye II, [2012] at 1 H.K.L.R.D. 650. 
200 Id. at 659. 
201 See Gu & Zhang, supra note 124, at 1023. 
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fora’s own standards would be emasculated. In this regard, the CA 
has been criticized for having too readily deferred its opinion of the 
enforceability of an award to the Mainland China supervisory court 
without full consideration and careful balancing of the relevant 
issues of the Hong Kong policy of justice and morality against the 
policy of pro-enforcement of the Mainland China award.202  
 Implication of the Keeneye in Cross-border Arbitral 
Relations 
In retrospect, the Keeneye case may be considered a skillful 
“maneuver” of being considerate to Mainland China arbitration 
system and legal institutions. The CA judgment was not crystal 
clear in its reasoning and is ambiguous enough to sustain different 
interpretations of the decision. As to what has been reflected in 
Keeneye, Tang VP at the CA, asked the panel to pay due regard to 
how mediation was normally conducted in the arbitral seat and to 
how the supervisory court would be in a better position to assess the 
norms of arbitration practice (i.e. whether mediation by way of a 
dinner meeting in a hotel with “work on” by other parties would be 
acceptable in Mainland China).203 The CA judgment, after all, never 
attempted to substitute its views for the Mainland China court’s 
interpretation on the properness of its arbitral procedure. The legal 
community in Mainland China seemed satisfied with this approach, 
the legal community in Hong Kong has, however, challenged the 
decision as deviating from Hong Kong’s former approach and 
standard. It was argued that the CA judgment gave too much 
deference to Mainland China’s arbitral practice. It was also 
commented that such recognition, or understanding, would foster 
cross-border arbitral and business relations.204 As the reasoning 
behind this approach was not fully explained in the judgment, both 
Mainland China and Hong Kong’s legal communities may read 
from the judgment what they desire. The jurisprudence problems at 
issue, however, are more complicated than merely whether Hong 
Kong courts recognize Mainland China arbitral practice or 
convergence between the two jurisdictions per se; such recognition 
involves legal repercussions which could determine the future 
                                                
202 See Morgan & Yeung, supra note 94, at 30-33. 
203 See Gu & Zhang, supra note 124, at 1023. 
204 See id. at 1026. 
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interaction trend and development path of the two arbitral systems 
across the border. 
First, the Keeneye case reveals a disagreement between Hong 
Kong courts concerning the relative weight they should place on the 
pro-enforcement policies of comity and finality and whether the 
court should defer its opinion on the enforceability of an award 
when the supervisory court’s public policy is substantially different 
from what the Hong Kong courts apply. As has been analyzed, this 
disagreement is undesirable and makes it difficult for parties to 
anticipate the outcome of enforcement challenges made under the 
public policy ground in Hong Kong.  
Second, there is the more subtle legal conflict between the two 
jurisdictions. The conflict has long been known to both sides, as 
Hong Kong and Mainland China have had different legal histories 
and have been driven by different sets of legal systems and 
ideologies. Even after unification for more than fifteen years, the 
legal, cultural, and ideological disparities between the two sides as 
reflected in Keeneye are still outstanding. The common expression 
of “work on” and the practice to involve third parties for influence 
in the Mainland Chinese arbitral process played a delicate role in 
the Keeneye case and led to different judgments in Mainland China 
and Hong Kong, as well as different rulings at the two levels of 
Hong Kong courts in Hong Kong. Judge Reyes at the CFI found 
apparent bias with the apprehension of “a fair minded observer” (in 
Hong Kong)205 whereas Tang VP at the CA based his judgment 
more on “an understanding of how mediation is normally conducted 
in the place where it was conducted” (in Mainland China).206 This 
shows that the different expectations of arbitral standards across the 
border can cause both legal and ideological conflicts, and as these 
differences persist, so will their corollary conflicts. In the particular 
scenario of med-arb, problems will arise more frequently with 
respect to Mainland China arbitration than with arbitrations from 
other New York Convention jurisdictions, as not only is the practice 
more popular in Mainland China arbitration, but there are less 
procedural safeguards accorded to parties in Mainland China as well. 
Hence, the impact of the Keeneye case on cross-border arbitration 
cannot be underestimated.  
                                                
205 Keeneye I, [2011] at 3 H.K.C. 157, para 53. 
206 Keeneye II, [2012] at 1 H.K.L.R.D. 659. 
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The Keeneye case also seems to indicate that the standard of 
public policy in the cross-border enforcement of arbitral awards in 
Hong Kong might be somewhat China-oriented, or comparatively 
more relaxed than what is applied to the New York Convention 
awards.207 Pursuant to the reasoning of the CA in Keeneye, because 
both parties involved in the arbitration come from Mainland China 
and the Mainland Chinese court has interpreted the legality of the 
case, it would thus be undesirable for Hong Kong courts to read into 
the mind of the Mainland China judges unless the issues threaten 
the fundamental justice and morality of Hong Kong.208 What is 
worth noting is that the legal issues such as bias, private caucus, 
confidentiality, and due process concerned in med-arb procedures, 
although challenged as problems in Hong Kong, have, however, 
been practiced for ages and never been considered as problems in 
[the] Mainland China dispute resolution context.209 As Mainland 
China lags behind in comparison to the common law’s respect of 
the rule of law and due process, similar disagreements over 
Mainland China’s arbitral practices are likely to arise. Hence, if 
Hong Kong’s public policy standards are applied rigidly, Hong 
Kong courts may find themselves facing all sorts of enforcement 
challenges of procedural violations and impartiality issues involving 
Mainland China awards.  
Such conflicts over arbitral standards are not particular to 
Keeneye, and can be found in many earlier cases, such as in Hebei 
(where the Mainland China arbitral authorities were found to have 
less respect for the importance of due process), and in Unruh v. 
Seeberger (where Mainland China had no qualms about 
champertous agreements). Regardless of legal terms and technical 
grounds, the real concern behind all of the worries seem to be the 
quality and integrity of Mainland China arbitral awards, especially 
when the awards are made by government-affiliated local arbitration 
commissions widespread throughout the nation after the taking 
effect of the AL in 1995.210 Hence, the Keeneye jurisprudence and 
the conflicts it involves reflect the difficulties, or delicate discontent, 
of Hong Kong courts in finding the appropriate balance between 
being pro-enforcement and respecting due process with respect to 
                                                
207 Gu & Zhang, supra note 124, at 1025. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. at 1025-26. 
210 For a brief account of the development of local arbitration commissions in Mainland 
China, see GU, supra note 8, at ch. 6. 
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Mainland-China-standard arbitration, even after one and a half 
decades of practice of cross-border arbitration. 
 Summary: The Jurisprudence of Cross-border Arbitration in 
Hong Kong with Mainland China 
To conclude this Part, with a view to the Tables on caseload 
change regarding the enforcement of Mainland China arbitral 
awards in Hong Kong, it can be seen that the Hong Kong courts 
have faithfully followed the pre-handover pro-enforcement policy 
and have heavily relied on New York Convention jurisprudence. 
Past the first two years after the promulgation of the Mutual 
Arrangement, the pro-enforcement policy as upheld by the Hebei 
case has kept award challenges to the rate as low as 10%.211 The 
success rate of challenges has similarly been quite low, at an 
average of 21% since the handover.212 With an overall enforcement 
rate as high as 95%, the good health of the cross-border arbitration 
enforcement system in Hong Kong with respect to Mainland China 
is evident.213 
Turning from statistics to legal development, the 
abovementioned cases represent the jurisprudence evolving thus far 
as to how Hong Kong courts have treated Mainland China awards 
and how they have defined their role in the cross-border arbitral 
order with respect to Mainland China. In summary, since the 1997 
handover, the jurisprudence has generally undergone four different 
phases, in which the Hong Kong courts have treated the 
enforcement of Mainland China arbitral awards with different 
attitudes.  
First, there was an enforcement dark age in the initial years of 
handover due to the legal vacuum regarding the cross-border 
arbitration scheme (1997-1999). It was followed by a significant 
rebound of cases after the promulgation of the Mutual Arrangement 
(2000-2001). The cross-border enforcement in Hong Kong kept 
calm and rode swift upon the wave of Hebei for a significant period 
of time (2002-2009). Finally, in the most recent years, there has 
been controversy and discontent over the “China-centric” 
                                                
211 Fifty-five Mainland awards have been applied for enforcement from the period from 
2002 to 2011, and only six of those have been challenged, amounting to an approximate 
10.90% challenge rate. See Table 1. 
212 See Table 2. 
213 See id. 
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enforcement standard since the publication of the Keeneye case 
(2010 and onwards). Some of these changes were due to 
circumstantial situations which bound the court, while others could 
be reflective of a conflicting judicial attitude juggling a desire to 
uphold Hong Kong’s high standard of arbitration (including its high 
standard of public policy, due process, and rule-of-law) and to 
accommodate the more relaxed standard of Mainland China 
arbitration practice to be pro-enforcement.   
Faced with the new challenge following the constitutional idea 
of “one country, two systems” and in the absence of a cross-border 
arbitration scheme between the two sides, it is noted that Hong 
Kong courts have not attempted to resist or limit the authority of 
Mainland China arbitral awards in the initial years following the 
handover. Instead, they have extended the New York Convention 
jurisprudence of being pro-enforcement towards Mainland Chinese 
awards (which used to be categorized as “foreign” before the 
handover). In the meantime, as shown in Hebei, they adhered to the 
common law approach of public policy and due process and 
managed to guide Mainland China in its development of an 
international-standardized arbitration system, by encouraging its 
reform and improvement.214 Hence, in the first dozen years after the 
handover (1997 to 2009), courts in Hong Kong seem to have 
handled well the dual challenges of finding her place in the new 
cross-border arbitration order by setting up a high standard of 
arbitration review in interaction with Mainland China and leading 
the new-born SAR forward in becoming a regional and international 
arbitration center. This ability to handle the dual challenges has 
been degraded, however, with the arrival of Keeneye, as the legal 
and ideological conflicts in the undercurrent between Hong Kong 
and Mainland China have been uncovered. 
Delving into the Keeneye jurisprudence, it seems that when 
reviewing Mainland China awards seeking enforcement in Hong 
Kong and in assessing Hong Kong’s public policy, the current 
approach is that the Hong Kong court is entitled to consider the 
question of bias from its own view point. But due regard should be 
given to the views of the Mainland China court as the supervisory 
court of arbitration. In the absence of a decision by the Mainland 
                                                
214 CIETAC reformed its Arbitration Rules in 2000, in response the Hebei judgment where 
the CIETAC award was turned down by Hong Kong courts. See more detailed discussions 
infra. 
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China court, the Hong Kong courts have full autonomy to interpret 
the public policy on their own and to decide the standard of 
enforcement in accordance with their own interpretation. Once the 
Mainland China court has spoken, however, the Hong Kong courts 
will comply. In the meantime, there is an equally important issue of 
estoppel. According to Hebei, the losing party, before coming to the 
enforcement court (i.e. the Hong Kong court), has to challenge first 
before the supervisory court (i.e. the Mainland China court); 
otherwise, the right to challenge would be considered waived and 
the party would be estopped from raising the challenge before the 
enforcement court. 215  Hence, whatever the Mainland China 
supervisory court is going to say about its arbitral procedure, the 
Hong Kong courts will be bound by it. Then what is the role of the 
enforcement court? The most recent jurisprudence has transmitted a 
clear message that the enforcement consideration, in particular, the 
public policy of Hong Kong, would be leaning towards, and may 
even be “subject to,” the perspective of Mainland China. Hong 
Kong is thus losing the autonomy to define its own public policy. 
Although the pro-China-enforcement policy might be appealing to 
the cross-border business community, particularly against the 
backdrop of the closer economic cooperation between the two sides, 
216  is the “China-centric” standard an appropriate approach? 
Moreover, is it a healthy interaction or phenomenon in terms of 
cross-border arbitration development? 
As previously analyzed, the Keeneye judgment underlies the 
controversy of how far Hong Kong courts should take into account 
and accommodate, if not lean towards, the decisions of the 
Mainland China courts in cross-border arbitration context. It was 
clear in Keeneye, as the disagreements of the two levels of the Hong 
Kong courts show, that there are reasonable concerns among the 
Hong Kong judiciary towards the fledging level of rule-of-law and 
informal dispute resolution culture in Mainland China. The CA 
judgment was thus challenged as too quick a deference to the 
Mainland China judicial decisions. Additionally, the Keeneye 
judgment was challenged for not having properly and carefully 
balanced Hong Kong’s policy of pro-enforcement against its high 
                                                
215 Hebei, [1999] at 2 H.K.C.F.A.R. 192, 194. 
216 Hong Kong and mainland China signed a Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement 
(CEPA) in 2003, providing an unprecedented platform for the close economic ties between 
the two regions. 
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standard of due process and, accordingly, Hong Kong may have lost 
its identity in the cross-border arbitral order.217 
 
 THE POSITIVE INTERACTION OF THE CROSS-BORDER 
ARBITRATION SYSTEM 
This following Part looks into how the Hong Kong 
jurisprudence on cross-border arbitration has impacted the Mainland 
China arbitration system through encouraging positive interaction. 
The “positive interaction” refers to such trend that the Mainland 
China arbitral authorities reflect on the enforcement judgments of 
the Hong Kong courts and become persuaded to improve their rules 
and practices to cohere with the high and internationally accepted 
arbitration standards that Hong Kong maintains. However, this trend 
of “positive interaction,” as will be explained subsequently, has 
been slowed down, or even hampered, since Keeneye. 
 
 The Hong Kong Standard and Positive Interaction before 
Keeneye 
The experience of Hong Kong’s arbitration is impactful upon 
the future reform of the rather young Mainland China arbitration 
system.218 As explained above, ever since the signing of the Mutual 
Arrangement, there have been signs of interaction of arbitration 
practices, where the Mainland China side has traditionally been 
more inclined towards adopting Hong Kong standards. 
Obviously, of the two jurisdictions, Hong Kong’s arbitration 
system is the more developed. First, Hong Kong adopted the 
UNCITRAL219 Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 
as early as 1996 and has, since 2011, extended the Model Law to 
govern both its domestic and international arbitrations.220 Being a 
                                                
217 Gu & Zhang, supra note 124, at 1025-26 (discussing the policy concerns of cross-
border enforcement of arbitral awards).  
218 The Chinese arbitration system began to take shape after the publication of its first 
Arbitration Law in 1994. For a general overview of the rather young and inexperienced 
Chinese arbitration system, see GU, supra note 8. 
219 UNCITRAL is the short for United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. 
220  Hong Kong adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration (the “Model Law”) in 1996 to govern its international arbitration regime, listed 
as Part II of the Arbitration Ordinance. In 2010, in the latest amendment to the Ordinance, 
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Model Law jurisdiction, Hong Kong has the benefit of being able to 
rely on a body of international arbitration jurisprudence and has 
been placed in a significantly advantageous position in being able to 
market its arbitration as being in line with international standards. 
On the other hand, the Mainland China arbitration system, with its 
first Arbitration Law published in 1994 and without subsequent 
amendment thus far, has been described as being much influenced 
by Chinese local standards and insufficient with respect to the 
protection of party and tribunal autonomy.221 Second, Hong Kong 
has a single, simple, and unified arbitration system, which Mainland 
China does not have. In Mainland China, foreign-related arbitrations 
and domestic arbitrations are treated very differently,222 and laws at 
the national level are often very vague, leaving much room for 
differences for laws and regulations from locality to locality or from 
arbitral institution to arbitral institution.223 Third, in terms of public 
policy standards, Hong Kong is more in line with international 
standards. For example, regarding due process issues, Hong Kong 
courts have adhered to the high standard set by the common law 
which has been developed for centuries. In other respects though, 
especially when dealing with non-domestic arbitration, courts in 
Hong Kong do not shy from using foreign standards, such as other 
common law practices, as well as other New York Convention 
jurisdictions’ practices. In contrast, in Mainland China, public 
policy carries a delicate and obscure definition, which refers to the 
concept of “social and public interest.” 224  “Social and public 
interest” in the Arbitration Law has remained a common criticism, 
as Chinese courts sometimes try to review the merits of the award 
under the pretext of local social and public interest such as local 
                                                                                                           
the Model Law was extended to govern the domestic arbitration in Hong Kong. The 
amended Arbitration Ordinance took effect in June 2011. 
221 GU, supra note 8, at 43. 
222 For an introduction on the dual-track arbitration system in the Mainland, see GU, supra 
note 8, at 24-32. 
223 For the local initiatives in filling the gap of laws at the Central level, see GU, supra note 
8, at 70-74. 
224 The basic principle of “social and public interest” was first established by the General 
Principles of Civil Law, which provided that “where this Chapter provides for the 
application of the law of a foreign country or of international practice, this must not be 
contrary to the public interest of the People’s Republic of China”. General Principles of the 
Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 150 (promulgated by President of China, 
Order No. 37, April 12, 1986, effective January 1, 1987), available at 
http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=2696.  
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protectionism concerns. 225  Moreover, there are no rule-of-law 
traditions and there is little respect for due process and formal 
dispute resolution procedures in Mainland China.  
Although the arbitration system in Hong Kong is not without 
deficiencies, the advantages outlined above should be respected and 
protected, as they have played important roles in developing Hong 
Kong into a regional and international hub for arbitration. To 
emphasize, the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre, in its 
promotional webpage, “Why Hong Kong?,” uses Hong Kong’s rule 
of law, the common law system, its pro-enforcement courts, and the 
fact that Hong Kong is a Model Law jurisdiction, as selling 
points.226 It is fair to say that when comparing the arbitration 
systems of Hong Kong and Mainland China, Hong Kong has been 
better off in many major aspects. 
It would then seem sensible that interaction between the two 
sides and of the cross-border arbitration regime towards the higher 
standards which Hong Kong maintains would be more logical than 
interaction the other way. Moreover, Mainland China, is as eager as, 
or perhaps more eager than, Hong Kong to market its arbitration 
regime as modern and international in order to attract foreign 
business and investment. However, the vision of what makes a 
modern arbitration system may not be shared in the same sense 
across the border at different times.  
Before Keeneye, the Mainland China arbitration authorities used 
to pay much attention to the Hong Kong courts’ treatment of the 
Mainland awards and respond to such judgments by reforming their 
arbitration regulations to cater to the concerns of the Hong Kong 
courts and towards the stricter due process standards applied in 
Hong Kong. The desire and willingness to make a change is 
predicated upon certain incentives seen from the Mainland China 
arbitral authorities for modernization. Such type of interaction is 
what we refer to in this Article as “positive interaction”.  
                                                
225 The Henan Dongfeng Garment case shows how a Chinese court applies the notion of 
“social and public interests” where the Court in this case equated the interests of a state-
owned enterprise to “social and public interests.” Henan Garment Imp. & Exp. (Group) Co. v. Kaifeng 
Dongfeng Garment Factory (unreported). See also, Song Hang, The Enforcement of Foreign-related Awards in China – Issues in 
Practice, 2 CHINA PRIVATE INT’L L. AND COMP. L.J. 357, 367-68 (1999) (in Chinese); Xiaowan Qiu, 
Enforcing Arbitral Awards Involving Foreign Parties: A Comparison of the United States 
and China, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 607, 611-12 (2000). 
226  Why Hong Kong, HKIAC.COM, http://www.hkiac.org/index.php/en/arbitration/why-
hong-kong (last visited Dec. 5, 2013).  
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One of the examples of such positive interaction took place in 1994 
when CIETAC revised its arbitration rules in response to the Paklito 
judgment where the Hong Kong court refused to enforce the 
Mainland China award on basis that the losing party was denied a 
fair and equal opportunity of presenting their case on the expert 
witness report.227 Accordingly, Articles 26 and 28 of the 1988 
CIETAC Rules were amended by Article 40 of the 1994 Rules, 
which afforded parties the right not only to express their opinions 
concerning an expert report, but also the right to require the experts 
to appear in the hearing to explain conclusions.228 It was clear that 
the CIETAC revision was in response to the Paklito case. 
In 1998, CIETAC introduced further revisions to its arbitration 
rules following an award challenged in the Hong Kong courts in 
Hebei.229 In Hebei, the respondent complained that the presiding 
arbitrator and expert witness appointed by the tribunal had inspected 
allegedly defective equipment in the presence of the claimant’s 
technicians but not the respondents. The award was subsequently 
challenged as being tainted by apparent bias and in violation of 
Hong Kong’s public policy. In the aftermath of the leading 
judgment on Hebei, Article 38 of the 1998 CIETAC Rules 
stipulated that, when investigating the facts and collecting evidence 
by the tribunal itself, the tribunal should, if necessary, promptly 
notify both parties to be present. 230  The 1998 revisions were 
confirmed by CIETAC in its further amendment in 2000.231 In a 
similar vein, as the flagship of locally-based arbitration institution in 
Mainland China, 232  Article 44 of the 2001 Beijing Arbitration 
Commission (the “BAC”) Rules was also amended to state: “[t]he 
[t]ribunal shall deliver to the parties the evidence collected on its 
                                                
227 See discussions supra, on Paklito. 
228 CIETAC Arbitration Rules 1994 English (promulgated by China Int’l Econ. and Trade 
Arbitration Comm’n., effective June 1, 1994) (Kluwer Arbitration). Compare Article 40 of 
the 1994 CIETAC Rules with Articles 26 and 28 of the 1989 CIETAC Rules. CIETAC 
Arbitration Rules 1989 English (promulgated by China Int’l Econ. and Trade Arbitration 
Comm’n., Sept. 12, 1988, effective Jan. 1, 1989) (Kluwer Arbitration).  See also Zhang, 
supra note 3, at 193 (discussing Paklito and subsequent revision of the CIETAC 
Arbitration Rules). 
229 See discussions supra on Hebei. 
230 CIETAC Arbitration Rules 1998, art. 38 (promulgated by China Int’l Econ. and Trade 
Arbitration Comm’n., May 6, 1998, effective May 10, 1998) (Kluwer Arbitration). See 
also, Zhang, supra note 37, at 480 (discussing the contents of Article 38).  
231 CIETAC Arbitration Rules 2001, art. 38 (promulgated by China Int’l Econ. and Trade 
Arbitration Comm’n., effective Oct. 1, 2000) (Kluwer Arbitration).  
232 For an introduction of the BAC as the flagship locally-based arbitration institution in 
mainland China, see GU, supra note 8, at 114-117.  
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own initiative [and t]he parties may provide cross-examination 
opinions in connection with the evidence collected by the 
[t]ribunal.”233 It was clear to everyone that these reforms were 
drawn from the Hong Kong experience, in particular the Hong 
Kong court’s criticisms of the lower standard and insufficiency of 
due process in the Mainland China arbitration. 
The abovementioned arbitration rule revisions are direct 
responses to Hong Kong’s treatment of Mainland China awards by 
Mainland China arbitration authorities. The reforms highlight a 
great desire of the Mainland side to not have its arbitration seen as 
sub-standard by the Hong Kong side in cross-border arbitral 
relations, and show the willingness of Mainland China to update its 
arbitration system towards the Hong Kong standard in order to 
achieve that goal. The reforms also show that the cross-border 
arbitration jurisprudence, all the way until Keeneye, has been clearly 
in line with the higher and stricter standard shaped by Hong Kong 
and the trend of interaction was an active and positive one where the 
lower and the more-relaxed standard arbitration regime (i.e. the 
Mainland China side) developed towards the higher and stricter 
standard (i.e. the Hong Kong side). 
 Is this Positive Interaction Slowing Down? 
As has been described in the previous section, in 2010, at the 
CFI, Judge Reyes refused to enforce the arbitral award in the 
Keeneye case, because the award was produced under apparent bias 
due to various circumstances, including the fact that the same 
arbitrator assisted in the mediation and “worked on” the parties.234  
Unfortunately, in the following year, in late 2011, Tang VP at the 
CA, reversed the decision of Judge Reyes, and held that there was 
no apparent bias in the case and that the lower court should have 
deferred to the Mainland China standard as applied by the 
supervising court as to whether the arbitration was conducted 
regularly or not.235  
                                                
233 2001 BAC Rules art. 44, (promulgated by Beijing Arbitration Comm’n., Apr. 25, 2001, 
effective Aug. 1, 2001), http://www.bjac.org.cn/en/arbitration/2001.html.  
234 Note that, according to Reyes, J., this mixture of arbitration and mediation, also known 
as med-arb, is not wrong in principle, and can be free from apparent bias if proper 
safeguards are in place. See Gao Keeneye I, [2011] at 3 HKC 157 para. 71. 
235 Gu & Zhang, supra note 124, at 1006. 
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In response to the Keeneye case, in its latest revision, CIETAC 
revised its arbitration rules once again (which came into effect on 
May 1, 2012), and notably, Article 45(8) of the 2012 Rules provides 
some relief to the much criticized med-arb practice in Mainland 
China. Article 45(8) provides: 
Where the parties wish to mediate their dispute but do 
not wish to have mediation conducted by the arbitral 
tribunal, CIETAC may, with the consent of both 
parties, assist the parties to mediate the dispute in a 
manner and procedure it considers appropriate.236 
 
Through the 2012 revision, if CIETAC, instead of the tribunal, 
provides for the mediation process, it seems less likely that the med-
arb award would be tainted by apparent bias, as CIETAC is not 
directly involved in the award-making process of the arbitration. 
Conversely, the arbitrators may not directly get involved in the 
mediation process. The latest CIETAC reform, therefore, appears to 
allay the concerns in the Keeneye case (particularly regarding some 
of the criticisms made by Judge Reyes), and to a certain extent 
mirrors the approach of having the roles of mediators and arbitrators 
assumed by different persons.237  
However, the revised provision is arguably insufficient as both 
parties need to be worried about bias such that they would agree to 
what would obviously be a more expensive procedure. In reality, if 
there is a likelihood of bias, it would be bias in favor of one party, 
and that party would be unlikely to consent to the procedure 
suggested by CIETAC’s revisions. Hence, although there is a 
response to the Keeneye case, it does not seem to be a response 
which would have satisfied the standard upheld in the CFI by Judge 
Reyes. This is because, unlike the previous two revisions by 
CIETAC in 1994 and 1998, the revised rules this time provide no 
mandatory standard which the arbitrators/mediators have to observe 
in a med-arb setting in order that the issue of apparent bias can be 
avoided or at least mitigated.  
Even more worrying, in the Keeneye case, the Mainland China 
arbitral procedure which was involved and criticized was issued by 
a locally-based arbitration institution, the Xi’an Arbitration 
                                                
236 CIETAC Arbitration Rules 2012 art. 45(8) (promulgated by China Int’l Econ. and 
Trade Arbitration Comm’n., Feb. 3, 2012, effective May 1, 2012), 
http://cn.cietac.org/rules/rules.pdf.  
237 Gu & Zhang, supra note 124, at 1027.  
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Commission. However, that institution has thus far made no attempt 
to either revise its arbitration rules, or provide clarifications on the 
difficulties the Hong Kong courts had in interpreting its med-arb 
procedures.238 It is reasonably believed that the quick deference to 
the Mainland China standard of med-arb by the CA in Keeneye has 
given the Mainland China arbitration institutions little incentive to 
develop their standard of arbitration towards that of Hong Kong, 
and may have thus slowed down the previous pace of positive 
interaction of the arbitration systems across the border. 
Despite the importance of the court’s pro-enforcement policy 
towards the business community, it is advocated that there is value 
when the Hong Kong courts refuse to bend to the more lax 
standards of due process in Mainland China in cross-border 
arbitration review and, rather, adhere to Hong Kong’s high standard 
of justice and morality, which the Hong Kong courts see as 
fundamental. This is because if deference is given towards a lower 
standard of arbitration presently held in Mainland China or even a 
specific locality in Mainland China, then a plethora of theoretical 
and practical problems, not only with respect to Hong Kong-
Mainland China cross-border arbitral relations but also beyond, 
could arise.  
First, instead of maintaining a single standard of a particular 
public policy rule in order for awards to be enforced in the region, 
by deference, Hong Kong is transmitting the message that it has a 
flexible and limitless number of standards. This causes much 
uncertainty for parties wishing to challenge the enforcement of an 
award. To challenge an award in Hong Kong, parties would have 
the impossible task of first evaluating whether enforcing the award 
would breach the public policy of Hong Kong, then whether such a 
breach is offensive in the lex arbitri, then evaluate what level of 
deference the courts in Hong Kong would give towards the opinion 
of the lex arbitri, and finally, assess their overall chance of success. 
Thus, absent a single standard, parties would be confused as to the 
requirements of Hong Kong’s arbitration scheme. 
Second, as the Hong Kong courts become more accommodative 
towards awards which breach Hong Kong’s public policy but are 
                                                
238 The current Xi’an Arbitration Commission Rules in practice were issued in January 
2008 and took effect in 2011. XI’AN ARBITRATION COMMISSION RULES, 
http://www.xaac.org/laws_12.html (last visited July 12, 2013). No further amendments 
have been introduced since Keeneye I, despite the wide criticism and debate the case 
received.  
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not offensive in the lex arbitri, those jurisdictions such as Mainland 
China, would obviously have less incentive to reform their 
arbitration systems towards the Hong Kong standard. Consequently, 
the positive interaction of the cross-border arbitration system 
between the two sides would be greatly hampered.  
Third, by subjecting itself to Mainland China’s lower standard 
of due process and informal dispute resolution practice, Hong Kong 
would lose the identity and autonomy in setting up its own standard 
in the cross-border arbitral order. As a result, Hong Kong will 
gradually be downgrading itself from the international arbitration 
center in the Greater China region to a local arbitration center 
serving Mainland China interests. In retrospect, before Keeneye, 
Mainland China had been looking upon the Hong Kong experience 
to upgrade itself and align with international arbitration norms and 
practices that Hong Kong maintains. Thus, it would be more 
advisable to protect Hong Kong’s heightened standard. 
Finally, Keeneye would either slow down the positive 
interaction pace between the two sides previously in place, or even 
to indicate a sign of negative interaction where Hong Kong is 
diluting its autonomy, distinctiveness, and competitiveness as a rule 
of law jurisdiction with English law foundations and becoming a 
jurisdiction catering to Mainland China legal and arbitration status 
quo. This may in turn harm the reputation of Hong Kong as an 
international and regional arbitration center that the SAR 
government has been working hard to maintain since the handover 
and moreover, create an image that Hong Kong is developing 
towards a localized arbitration service center for Mainland China.  
Due to the abovementioned reasons, too quick a deference 
towards Mainland China’s standard without properly and carefully 
balancing Hong Kong’s own standard of public policy is concluded 
as unwise, particularly because Mainland China had been 
attempting to positively interact, converge, and harmonize its 
arbitration system with that of Hong Kong over the years. Parties on 
both sides have much to gain from a harmonized cross-border 
arbitration system, but that harmonized system should be of a 
proper type benchmarked against the higher arbitration standards 
(i.e. positive interaction). The ultimate aim is that, through positive 
interaction, parties and arbitral authorities at the Mainland China 
side will improve themselves. They will have similar 
understandings, expectations, and attitudes towards arbitration as 
required under international norms and practices, which will in turn 
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decrease conflicts on procedural and legal issues across the border, 
increase the chances of settlement, and facilitate economic 
integration in the Greater China region. Hong Kong should take 
advantage of its developed rule of law and common law traditions 
and has an important role to play in this positive interaction process. 
In conclusion, Hong Kong should maintain its distinctiveness and 
high standards in cross-border arbitration review so as to encourage 
the continued positive improvement of the Mainland China 
arbitration regime which is mutually beneficial to both jurisdictions 
post-handover. 
 
 CONCLUSION 
In the fifteen years since the sovereignty handover, much has 
happened in the realm of cross-border arbitration in Hong Kong 
with respect to Mainland China. The cross-border arbitration system 
has seen its demise, rebirth, redevelopment and then Hong Kong’s 
delicate discontent in recent years.  
The demise came about when the New York Convention was 
rendered inapplicable in July 1997 because of the sovereignty 
handover, removing the basis of what was once a complete and 
smoothly running mechanism for the mutual recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards. Cross-border arbitration then went 
into a two year limbo in which Mainland China awards were not 
capable of being enforced in Hong Kong. With the application of 
the Mutual Arrangement between Mainland China and Hong Kong 
in 2000, the system was recreated by essentially redrafting the 
provisions of the New York Convention into a bilateral agreement 
between the two jurisdictions. Over the following years, the Hong 
Kong courts rebuilt the system on basis of the former Convention 
jurisprudence. The pro-enforcement policy during the Convention 
era in Hong Kong was reinforced by the Hebei case, and parties 
came to respect that the new cross-border arbitration system was 
just as respectable and stable as the former Convention-based cross-
border arbitration system with respect to Mainland China arbitral 
awards.  
However, with the arrival of the Keeneye case, the reinforced 
stability of the cross-border arbitration system was undermined. The 
case calls into question the once firm rule that it was the public 
policy standard of the enforcement court (i.e. the Hong Kong court) 
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which is relevant in an enforcement challenge, and not that of the 
seat of the arbitration or supervisory court (i.e. the Mainland China 
court), although it requires the taking into consideration of the 
views of the supervisory court such that only fundamental breaches 
of justice and morality in Hong Kong can be valid grounds to refuse 
to enforce an outside arbitral award. However, the Hong Kong 
Court of Appeal judgment in Keeneye seems to suggest that Hong 
Kong should instead refer itself and subject itself to the standards of 
Mainland China in assessing the properness of arbitration even 
when there are irregular awards with genuine issues of public policy 
seeking enforcement in Hong Kong. Arguably, this approach could 
keep enforcement rates high and might avoid the many conflicts 
which would arise from all the potential procedural violations and 
impartiality issues in Mainland China as a huge developing legal 
system undergoing rapid economic transformation and with much 
less respect for the rule of law and due process. However, as has 
been strenuously argued, this perplexing judgment of Keeneye has 
caused Hong Kong to lose much of its distinctiveness and 
competitiveness in defining its own public policy and, in the 
meantime, has slowed down or even hampered the positive 
interaction trend in the cross-border arbitration development with 
Mainland China. Although parties on both sides might gain from a 
“China-centric” cross-border arbitration system, this Article argues 
that the proper type of interaction bears much more value than the 
interaction per se. The cross-border arbitration system should be 
developed continuing the positive improvement and benchmarked 
against the higher and internationally accepted standards of 
arbitration that Hong Kong maintains (i.e. positive interaction). It is 
unfortunate that the past pattern of positive interaction has been 
slowed down or even hampered in most recent years. Where the 
Mainland China arbitration institutions used to revise their 
arbitration rules in order to display a visage that their arbitration 
awards would be up to the standards of Hong Kong, now the Hong 
Kong courts defer to the arbitration standards of Mainland China. 
As such, the incentive for the Mainland China arbitration regime to 
improve and reform itself towards the Hong Kong standards is 
removed or diminished. 
Despite this recent downturn, it is argued that the positive 
interaction trend should be and will be resumed, as Hong Kong 
seeks to maintain its image as an international arbitration 
powerhouse with a strong rule-of-law, and Mainland China has 
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made the improvement of its arbitration system a continued 
endeavor for serving trade and investment interests.239 Streamlining 
and improving the cross-border arbitration system will be critical 
for both jurisdictions. In the long run, this synchronized cross-
border arbitration consensus will bring about the healthy 
development of legal cooperation and judicial assistance and gear 
up economic growth in the Greater China region. 
Last but not the least, the existing English-language literature on 
Hong Kong’s relation with Mainland China post-handover, as in the 
legal approaches generally, focuses mainly on the constitutional 
order of “one country, two systems,” and to some extent, the role of 
Hong Kong in the context of China’s booming economy and trade 
internationalization. Little attention has been devoted to legal 
interactions in the conflict of laws field and how Hong Kong could 
contribute to Mainland China’s legal development, such as 
engaging “positive interaction” and encouraging improvement of 
rules and practices at the Mainland side through cross-border 
judicial review over arbitral awards (as this Article has identified, 
argued, and advocated). It is hoped that this Article can enhance the 
academic sensitivity to the issues generated by the rapid 
transformations in the field. It is further hoped that this Article can 
contribute to, and stimulate greater interest in, the study of conflict 
of laws between Hong Kong and Mainland China. 
 
                                                
239 The continued improvement of the arbitration system is important to the trade and 
investment interests in China. On this point, see arguments in GU, supra note 8, at 197-209. 
